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Abstract 
In a large sample of U.S. domestic M&As over 1993-2014, we examine whether the market 
perceives transfer of intangible capital in mergers to be value enhancing. We find that acquirer 
announcement-period abnormal returns are significantly higher in acquisitions where acquirers 
have relatively lower intangible capital than targets. This supports the hypothesis that value is 
created for acquirer shareholders in the mergers involving intangible capital transfer from targets 
to bidders. Further, we find that the greater the target’s intangible assets relative to those of the 
acquirer’s, the higher the synergy created by an acquisition. This indicates that acquisitions by 
firms with relatively lower intangible capital generate higher total gains. 
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I Introduction 
Intangible assets - referring to rights, privileges, and competitive edges derived from the ownership 
of long-lived non-physical assets - are an essential and increasing part of the capital stock in the 
economy. Recent studies show that intangible capital has become a significant factor of production 
to firms and thus is capable of yielding abnormal returns, thereby generating firms’ future growth1. 
It is worth noting that this unique type of investment is partly embedded within firms’ products 
and employees and is therefore hard to duplicate by competitors. There is, however, a potential to 
transfer intangible capital from one firm to another, for example, from a target to the acquirer 
(Ranft & Lord, 2000). This paper will investigate whether the transfer of intangible capital occurs 
across firms in mergers and acquisitions (M&As). The investigation will also identify whether 
such transfer contributes to takeover gains.  
Firms invest in intangible assets in two ways: a) internally create and b) externally purchase. 
Internally created intangible assets are developed primarily by investing in self-innovation 
activities. When such investments are commercially successful, they are transformed into 
intangible capital and create corporate value and growth. As it is challenging and costly to create 
intangible assets, firms often prefer to obtain access to such assets through external purchases (Lev, 
2000). However, because intangible assets are embedded in tangible products such as software-
operated machine tools or a key labour input such as engineers and researchers, they can be 
difficult to quantify and trade, thus explaining the absence of separate markets for such assets. The 
acquisition of an entire firm may be a plausible way of buying or selling such intangible assets. 
Thus, the incentives to purchase or outsource intangible assets could be a motive for M&As. 
In M&As, the value of intangible capital likely plays an important role, since the proportion of a 
firm’s intangible capital relative to total capital appears to be large (Lev, 2000; Corrado & Hulten, 
2010), and its contribution to firms’ productivity and growth is significant. These traits raise 
                                                 
1 Evidence shows a significant effect of intangible assets in economic and corporate performance. Including intangible 
capital as an input or an output has a significant impact on the understanding of economic growth (Corrado, Hulten, 
& Sichel, 2009). Firm-level estimates of intangible capital are positively related to firms’ market valuation, 
performance, and future returns (Lev & Sougiannis, 1996; Gu & Wang, 2005; Matolcsy & Wyatt, 2008; Lev, 
Radhakrishnan, & Zhang, 2009) 
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investors’ interest in intangible capital and may lead them to obtain such capital via M&As. The 
proprietary nature of intangible assets results in the heterogeneity of such assets between acquirers 
and targets, offering substantial opportunities for value creation through takeovers. The starting 
point for our investigation is the heterogeneity of intangible assets between acquirers and targets, 
and then we test the primary hypotheses on intangible capital transfer in M&As. Based on the 
evidence suggesting that firms with a relatively high proportion of intangible capital are more 
likely to become targets compared to those with a low proportion of intangible capital (Ranft & 
Lord, 2000; Faria, 2008), a positive intangible capital transfer from targets to acquirers can be 
expected to occur during a takeover. Therefore, the first hypothesis we put forward asks whether 
acquirers merge targets with a relatively high proportion of intangible capital. If the market values 
high-intangibles targets, does the intangible capital transfer from targets to acquirers have a 
positive valuation effect?  
In contrast to physical assets, which are capitalized on the balance sheet, most intangible assets 
are usually expensed in the income statement, leading to the deficiency in the disclosure of 
intangibles. Information asymmetry related to this deficiency results in high-intangibles firms 
incurring excessive capital costs and thus suffering from underinvestment in innovation activities. 
Another possible consequence of this information asymmetry is the discounted prospects of 
investments in intangibles, leading to the undervaluation of firms with a high proportion of 
intangibles assets. In this situation, acquirers would be expected to capture benefits from the 
transfer of intangible capital across firms by utilizing the capital and mitigating the effects of a 
harsh investment environment for intangibles. Further, since intangible capital is generally tacit 
and therefore difficult to value in acquisitions, to better investigate the transfer effect of intangible 
capital and to reflect different innovation activities, two kinds of intangible capital are posited – 
knowledge capital and organization capital. Knowledge capital refers to patents, technologies, and 
other assets from the discovery and learning process; organization capital refers to human resource 
practice and organizational structures. 
Inspired by Wang and Xie (2009), who examine the relationship between shareholder rights 
transfer and synergistic gains in M&As, we use the similar approach to test the relationship 
between intangible capital transfer and abnormal announcement returns in M&As. The intangible 
capital transfer in a merger is measured as the target’s intangible capital minus the acquirer’s 
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intangible capital. A positive intangible capital transfer indicates that the target firm holds a higher 
proportion of intangible assets than the acquirer prior to the merger. Following earlier studies on 
measuring intangible capital (e.g., Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Eisfeldt & Papanikolaou, 2013, 
2014; Peters & Taylor, 2017), we rely on the stock of knowledge capital estimated by capitalizing 
research and development (R&D) expenses and the stock of organization capital estimated by 
capitalizing selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses. The motive for this approach 
is that R&D expenses are related to knowledge capital such as patents, technologies, and software, 
and a part of SG&A expenses are related to organization capital such as employee training, 
compensation systems, and organizational designs. The sum of capitalized expenses constitutes 
the off-balance-sheet intangible capital, namely, intangible capital not shown on a firm's balance 
sheet. Proxies for total intangible capital are estimated by combining the off-balance-sheet 
intangibles with intangibles that are included on the balance sheet. Event study methodology is 
then used, i.e., estimates cumulative abnormal announcement returns over a five-day window [-2, 
+2] based on the market model as proxies for acquisition announcement performance. Following 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) and Wang and Xie (2009), we construct synergy, the combined 
returns of the acquirer and the target, for each acquisition using a value-weighted portfolio of the 
acquirer and the target’s abnormal announcement returns as a proxy for the total value creation 
through the acquisition.  
In a sample of 1,607 completed domestic acquisitions by public U.S. firms from 1993 to 2014, the 
following patterns are observed. First, the average value of targets’ intangible capital minus 
acquirers’ intangible capital appears to be positive, suggesting that bidders tend to take over firms 
with higher level of intangible capital to accumulate such capital. Second, the intangible capital 
transfer from targets to acquirers has a significantly positive impact on acquirer abnormal returns 
around announcement day. A one standard deviation (56%) increase in intangible capital transfer 
leads to a 47 basis point increase in acquirer abnormal announcement returns. However, there is 
no significant relationship between target abnormal announcement returns and the transfer of 
intangible capital, suggesting that this transfer positively affects the acquirer’s shareholders but 
not necessarily benefit the target’s shareholders. Third, tests of intangible capital transfer on the 
combined returns of targets and acquirers suggest that a one standard deviation (56%) increase in 
intangible capital transfer leads to a 54 basis point increase in the combined returns. This finding 
indicates that additional value is created for the combined firm through an M&A involving 
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intangible capital transfer from the target to the acquirer, as a result of the redeployment of assets 
and the mitigation of underinvestment and undervaluation. Further, when isolating the off-balance-
sheet intangible capital, knowledge capital, and organization capital, the transfer effects on the 
acquirer and target abnormal announcement returns and combined returns largely hold. However, 
the magnitude of the contribution from the off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfers is higher 
than that from the total intangible capital transfer, and organization capital transfer contributes 
more than knowledge capital transfer to acquirer shareholders returns. This finding suggests that 
off-balance-sheet intangible capital and organization capital are more likely to create greater 
benefits for acquirers as well as the takeovers overall than knowledge capital. All results hold for 
alternative proxies for takeover abnormal announcement returns we considered and are robust 
when taking into account the influence of industry-level competition, diversification, and high-
tech deals. Therefore, our study provides substantial evidence for the existence of intangible capital 
transfer and the value creation potential of intangible capital transfer from targets to acquirers. 
This paper makes two significant contributions to the existing literature. First, it adds to the volume 
of M&As work by providing strong evidence that intangible capital transfer from targets to the 
acquirers is a plausible source of merger gains. Existing studies show nothing new in suggesting 
takeovers are motived by synergies, inefficient market misevaluation, the Q theory hypothesis, the 
hubris hypothesis, and market timing (e.g., Roll, 1986; Bradley et al., 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 
2003; Rhodes-Kropf & Viswanathan, 2004; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, & Teoh, 2006). Wang 
and Xie (2009) propose that corporate governance transfer is one channel of value creation in 
M&As. A more recent study by Hegde and Mishra (2017) identifies strategic risk transfer as 
another potential channel of value creation in M&As. Our study shows that acquisitions in which 
acquirers with a relatively low proportion of intangible capital acquire targets with a high 
proportion of intangible capital create value for acquirers’ shareholders and takeovers overall. In 
other words, bidders are able to improve the utilization of intangible capital that they acquire from 
targets and mitigate the underinvestment and undervaluation problems relating to targets’ 
intangible capital.  
Second, this paper offers new evidence suggesting that intangible investment is positively 
associated with firm performance. Prior studies have demonstrated that intangible input, output, 
and efficiency are significantly positively associated with a firm’s value and performance (e.g., 
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Lev & Sougiannis,1996; Chan, Lakonishok, & Sougiannis, 2001; Eberhart, Maxwell, & Siddique, 
2004; Gu & Wang, 2005; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Lev, Sarath, & Sougiannis, 2005; Eberhart, 
Maxwell, & Siddique, 2008; Lev, Radhakrishnan, & Zhang, 2009; Hirshleifer, Hsu, & Li, 2013; 
Eisfeldt & Papanikoloau, 2013, 2014). In M&A settings, Bena and Li (2014) focus on intellectual 
capital and show that corporate innovation activities are a key factor driving acquisitions and 
positively affect merger outcomes. Li, Qiu, and Shen (2018) emphasize organization capital and 
find that acquirers with high organization capital achieve significantly higher long-run abnormal 
returns and higher post-merger stock performance. Our study combines both knowledge capital 
and organization capital and focuses on the transfer of intangible capital from targets to acquirers, 
instead of a firm’s unilateral capital stock. More specifically, we observe that, on average, targets 
own higher intangible capital than acquirers, and intangible capital transfer from targets to 
acquirers contributes positively to acquirer abnormal announcement returns and overall acquisition 
synergy. After differentiating between total intangible capital and off-balance-sheet intangible 
capital, we find that the off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfer has a relatively significant 
impact on acquirer abnormal announcement returns comparing to total intangible capital transfer. 
By differentiating between knowledge capital and organization capital, we provide evidence that 
organization capital transfer from targets to acquirers contributes more to acquirer abnormal 
announcement returns than knowledge capital transfer does. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II summarizes related literature and develops 
our hypotheses based on previous work. Section III describes the sample construction and 
variables selection. Section IV presents empirical results of main regressions and test the effects 
of industry-level competition, diversification, and high-tech firms’ combination. Robustness and 
sensitivity tests are present in Section V. We conclude in Section VI. 
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II Literature and Hypotheses 
A. Related literature 
This study is closely related to two areas covered by the literature. First, there is a considerable 
amount of literature on M&As demonstrating how mergers are performed and why a merger may 
take place. Studies devoted to the effect of takeovers on targets and acquirers have consistently 
concluded that target firms have significant positive abnormal returns (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; 
Jarrell, Brickley, & Netter, 1988; Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001), whereas acquirers only 
gain slight, but not significant, positive returns (Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins 1983; Eckbo, 1983) 
or even make a small loss from the transactions (Dodd, 1980). Given that acquirers in takeovers 
do not appear to lose much, and targets obtain substantial positive abnormal returns, takeovers, in 
general, create value (Jensen & Ruback,1983). 
The literature identifies several dominant motives for corporate takeover activities. First, 
economies of scale and economies of scope of M&As create synergies for shareholders and thus 
drive acquisition activities (Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Bradley et al., 1998). Second, the inefficient 
market misevaluation hypothesis argues that market inefficiency leads to the overvaluation of 
acquirers relative to targets, thus affecting takeover activities (Shleifer & Vishny, 2003). Third, 
the Q theory hypothesis proposes that mergers are a channel for reallocating physical capital to 
more productive projects and more effective managers and that merger waves can be a response 
to capital relocation opportunities (Jovanovic & Rousseau, 2002). Fourth, the hubris hypothesis 
suggests that managers’ overconfidence in their ability to extract value through M&As drives 
mergers (Roll, 1986). Fifth, market timing and industry shock also contribute to merger activities, 
and industry shock causes firms and even industries to experience negative returns, which may 
explain the underperformance of acquirers (Harford, 2005).  
More recent studies have strengthened a new line of research on value creation with respect to 
M&A activities. For instance, Wang and Xie (2009) demonstrate the value creation potential of 
corporate governance transfer from the acquirer to the target. In an acquisition in which acquirer’s 
governance is transferred to target with relatively poor governance, target governance will be 
replaced and improved, resulting in better use of target’s assets and thus creates value for the 
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takeover. Hegde and Mishra (2017) suggest that strategic risk transfer may be another channel of 
value creation in M&As. They find that target firms with excess risk aversion are likely to suffer 
from underinvestment and undervaluation and are therefore more valuable to acquirers that can 
restructure them. Acquisitions in which a risk-taking acquirer takes over a risk-avoiding target can 
generate significant value through the restructuring of the target. Our study attempts to highlight a 
possible alternative motive for mergers by demonstrating that the transfer of intangible capital 
from targets to acquirers generates additional value in a takeover.  
The second area of the literature relates to intangible capital and its components. Previous studies 
have failed to outline a clear and consistent pattern with respect to the category of intangible capital. 
A possible reason for this is that intangible capital is usually generated by a combination of firms’ 
resources, leading to the distinction between different intangible assets blurred. Lev (2000) 
categorizes intangible capital into three groups – discovery, human resources, and organizational 
practice – based on their relationship to the asset creator. Follow-up studies by Lev and 
Radhakrishnan (2005) and Lev et al. (2009) have also adopted this categorization when discussing 
organization capital. Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013, 2014) describe organization capital as 
intangible capital embodied in firms’ key talents. Furthermore, Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel (2009) 
and Hulten and Hao (2008) categorize intangible capital as R&D and organizational and human 
assets, while Peters and Taylor (2017) separate intangibles into knowledge capital and organization 
capital. Regardless of how intangible capital is categorized, these studies apply a similar 
underlying logic to estimate intangible capital. The stock of intelligence or knowledge capital is 
estimated as the capitalized R&D expenses, and the stock of organization capital or human assets 
is estimated as a fraction of capitalized SG&A expenses. The size of this fraction differs between 
studies that employ different definitions of organization capital. Our study follows the work of 
Peters and Tylor (2017) to categorize the stock of intangible capital into capitalized R&D expenses 
– the knowledge capital – and a fraction of capitalized SG&A expenses – the organization capital. 
There is a growing literature that has studied knowledge capital and organization capital and 
established the relations between these investments and firms’ value and performance. As 
elaborated by Lev (2000, pp.61), R&D, or knowledge capital, “is found to be an important 
contributor to firm’s productivity, growth, and capital market value. The magnitude of this 
contribution – return on R&D investment – varies across industries and over time but is, by and 
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large, considerably higher than firms’ cost of capital; hence the value creation capability of R&D”.  
Empirical research supports that R&D expenses input, knowledge capital output, and innovation 
efficiency are significantly positively related to corporate future operating performance, expected 
stock returns, and market valuation. A number of studies, such as Lev and Sougiannis (1996), 
Eberhart et al. (2004, 2008), and Lev et al. (2005), demonstrate a positive association between 
R&D investment and future stock returns. The second group of studies, such as Gu and Wang 
(2005), Matolcsy and Wyatt (2008), and Cohen, Pandit, Wasley, and Zach (2011), reveal that the 
outcome of innovations, for example, the patent citations, are positively associated with firms' 
stock returns and future earnings. Hirshleifer et al. (2013) find that innovative efficiency, measured 
as patents and patent citations per dollar of R&D investment, is positively related to expect returns 
after controlling firm characteristics and risk. However, Jensen (1993) finds that investors are 
optimistic towards the outcomes of in-process R&D projects. Evidence from Chan et al. (2001) 
indicates that the average stock returns with R&D are comparable to returns without R&D because 
the stock price already incorporates the benefit generated by R&D spending. They argue that 
investors are overestimating the benefit from R&D because of the wide coverage of R&D intensive 
industries by popular media. 
Organization capital is an agglomeration of technologies including human resource practices and 
unique structural and organizational designs that enable superior operation, investment, and 
innovation, and generate sustainable competitive advantages for the enterprises (Lev 
Radhakrishnan, & Zhang, 2009). It refers to the firm’s ability to integrate human skill and physical 
capital into underlying systems and operating processes to deliver the desired products (Evenson 
& Westphal, 1995). The potential ability of organization capital to generate higher-than-average 
expected stock returns is supported by the studies of Lev et al. (2009) and Eisfeldt and 
Papanikoloau (2013, 2014). Therefore, organization capital is a persistent creator for a firm’s value 
and growth.  
As both knowledge and organization assets are value-relevant and contribute significantly to firms' 
growth, investors are increasingly interested in the intangible capital as an investment opportunity. 
However, two potential difficulties may be encountered when investing in intangible assets. First, 
compared with developing intangible assets internally, firms may prefer to purchase them 
externally due to the high cost of self-investment and the uncertain outcomes of the development 
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process (Lev, 2000). Second, intangible assets are inherently difficult to trade on their own. With 
respect to knowledge capital, it is difficult to designate innovation activities and share outcomes 
between parties (Lev, 2000). As for organization capital, its combination of underlying systems 
and information without a physical embodiment is tacit, so it is hard to trade and generally only 
transfers along with the ownership of a firm (Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005). These obstacles may 
provide incentives for firms in need of intangible capital to accumulate such assets by taking over 
high-intangibles firms. For example, acquisitions in high-tech firms could be motivated by the 
advanced knowledge-based technologies and capabilities of target firms (Ranft & Lord, 2000). 
Another incentive for obtaining intangible capital by acquiring high-intangibles firms is the 
potential gains from the acquisitions. Gains from M&As may be perceived to exist if acquirers 
find it cheaper to acquire mature intangible assets externally than to create such assets internally 
by investing in R&D or organization capital, or if targets benefit more from the transfer of 
intangibles than from the potential long-term profits of intangibles (Faria, 2008).  
In the M&A settings, the valuation of intangible capital is not the same as the valuation of physical 
capital. In contrast to the transparent disclosure of physical capital required in corporate financial 
statements, the current accounting disclosure environment for intangible capital, in which almost 
all intangibles are expensed in the income statement, leads to a failure in disclosing the value of 
intangible capital. Such information asymmetry caused by the lack of disclosure of intangibles to 
capital markets results in two consequences: the excessive cost of capital for intangible-intensive 
firms and the systematic undervaluation of intangible assets. Boone and Raman (2001) report a 
significant positive relationship between R&D expenditures and stock bid-ask spreads. The bid-
ask spreads reflect the investors’ transaction costs, which in turn affects firms’ cost of capital. Shi 
(1999) and Chan et al. (2001) finds that increased R&D expenditures are associated with the 
increase in the cost of debt for listed firms. The high cost of capital may reduce the ability of 
intangible-intensive firms to generate sufficient funds to finance new projects and may, therefore, 
hamper firms’ investment and growth. Lev et al. (2005) find that investors systematically 
undervalue young, intangible-intensive firms with a high R&D expenditures growth rate but a 
relatively low earnings growth rate. Firms with high R&D growth but low earnings growth indicate 
poor capital market performance, as investors are likely to discount the future profitability of these 
firms' R&D significantly. As a result, such firms are likely to be undervalued. 
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B. Hypotheses 
Intangible assets are unique to firms and are difficult for competitors to mimic (Prescott & Visscher, 
1980). This feature may lead to the heterogeneity of intangible capital among firms. For example, 
levels of intangible capital between acquirers and targets in takeovers are likely to differ. Evidence 
shows that young, small and underperforming firms, which are more likely to become targets 
according to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), have relatively low learning costs relating to new 
technologies and innovations and tend to undertake research, while large firms devote a much 
smaller proportion of their budget to R&D spending as they can gain access to innovations through 
acquisitions (Arrow, 1993). As a result, bidders with lower levels of intangible capital are more 
likely to acquire targets with higher levels of intangible capital. The existing literature outlines the 
potential for the transfer of intangible assets from one firm to another along with the transfer of a 
firm’s ownership (Capron & Pistre, 2002; Lev & Radhakrishnan, 2005; Li et al., 2018). As bidders 
accumulate intangible capital by acquiring high-intangibles targets, the intangible capital transfer 
from the target to the acquirer can be expected. 
Following the literature, the information asymmetry associated with the disclosure of intangible 
capital leads to a relatively demanding investment environment for intangible-intensive targets. 
Target firms with high levels of intangible capital may suffer from underinvestment due to the 
excessive cost of capital, which is comparatively low for bidders with low levels of intangible 
capital. Post-merger, acquirers not only obtain intangible capital from targets but also enable a 
relatively low financing cost towards investment in intangibles to alleviate previous 
underinvestment issues. With competitive intangible capital in-hand and with sufficient 
investment, acquirers should achieve higher takeover returns. In addition, because of the 
systematic undervaluation of intangibles resulting from the information asymmetry described 
above, targets with high levels of intangible capital tend to be undervalued and are thus worth more 
for acquirers. These arguments lead us to make the following prediction: 
H1: Value is created for acquirer shareholders in the mergers involving intangible capital transfer 
from targets to bidders.  
The value generated for acquirers should be at least partially reflected in their abnormal 
announcement returns. Thus, a positive association between acquirer abnormal announcement 
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returns and the intangible capital transfer from targets to bidders is expected from the first 
hypothesis. 
Since firms’ intangible capital comprises knowledge and organization capital, we next consider 
the effects of these two forms of intangible capital. Although knowledge capital is expected to 
generate abnormal returns because of its competitive edge, some studies (e.g., Hall, 1993; Chan et 
al., 2001) have failed to display its superior contribution to stock returns. One possible explanation 
is that the transparency of knowledge capital is increasing as a result of more in-depth media and 
analysts’ coverage of R&D intensive firms and the accounting disclosure of the separately reported 
item of R&D expenses in firm’s income statements (Lev, 2000; Chan et al., 2001). Increased 
transparency alleviates the information asymmetry related to knowledge capital, thus relieving 
pressure on the investment environment for R&D. Unlike knowledge capital, organization capital 
is relatively tacit since investment in organization capital is not reported separately in firms’ 
financial statements. Expenditures on organization intangibles such as employee training, 
customer relationships, and brand enhancement, are generally combined with other expenses and 
captured as a fraction of SG&A spending. A review of the literature relating to intangible capital 
shows that a large number of studies have been conducted on knowledge capital from the 1980s 
onwards, but limited studies have documented organization capital systematically until the early 
2000s. The research intensity does not necessarily result in an insufficient exploration of 
organization capital but may partially reflect the lack of transparency with respect to organization 
capital and information asymmetry for organization-capital-intensive firms. Thus, the transfer of 
organization capital from the target to the acquirer is expected to have a significant and positive 
effect on abnormal announcement returns. Further, this effect is expected to be stronger than the 
effect of the transfer of knowledge capital. We have the following sub-hypotheses: 
H1a: Mergers involving knowledge capital transfer from targets to bidders will not be associated 
with higher acquirers’ abnormal announcement returns. 
H1b: Mergers involving organization capital transfer from targets to bidders are positively 
associated with higher acquirers’ abnormal announcement returns. 
Targets with high levels of intangible capital suffer from undervaluation and are discounted 
heavily by investors. A heavily discounted target is associated with a higher bid premium and 
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higher target abnormal announcement returns (Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1989), thus leading to the 
second hypothesis. 
H2: Targets with higher than bidder’s intangible capital receive higher premiums in mergers thus 
demonstrate higher abnormal announcement returns. 
The combination of the above hypotheses suggests the conjecture that the reallocation of intangible 
capital is more appropriate and efficient. Evidence shows that after the transaction, intangible 
capital transferred from targets enhances acquirers’ ability to achieve high innovative efficiency 
and generate extra earnings (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2006; Sun, 2014; Li et al., 2018). Besides, a 
target that accumulates a significant amount of intangible capital is likely to face financial 
constraints due to excessive capital costs, which in turn result in underinvestment in potential 
innovation projects. The entire acquisition should create value if the intangible assets are 
transferred to the acquirer with relatively low financing costs. Therefore, one possible positive 
outcome for overall acquisition is the synergistic gains from the transfer of intangible capital: The 
greater the intangible capital transfer from the target to the bidder the more synergies are created. 
Accordingly, the third hypothesis is posited: 
H3: Mergers involving intangible capital transfer from targets to bidders are perceived to create 
synergy thus demonstrate higher abnormal announcement return for the combined firms. 
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III Data 
A. Sample source 
For the acquirers represented in the executive compensation database, acquisitions made between 
January 1, 1993, and December 31, 2014, available in Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) 
platinum U.S. Mergers and Acquisitions database are extracted, provided the following initial 
criteria are met as per Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007):  
a. U.S. domestic completed mergers and acquisitions. 
b. Both acquirers and targets are public firms. 
c. Acquirers control less than 50% of shares in the target prior to announcement day and 
control 100% of the shares of targets after the transaction2. 
d. The deal value disclosed in SDC is more than $1 million and is at least 1% of the acquirer’s 
market value of equity as measured on the 11th trading day prior to the announcement 
date3. 
e. For both acquirers and targets, annual financial statements and sufficient daily stock returns 
to estimate cumulative abnormal returns are available from Compustat and the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database, respectively. 
f. Data on the replacement cost of intangible capital are available from the Peters and Taylor 
Total Q database on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
                                                 
2 In our sample, most of the acquirers have no ownership in the targets prior to the announcement. The acquirers 
control a small portion of target shares only in 38 out of 1,607 acquisitions. The average percentage acquirers 
controlling prior to the announcement is 18.47% for the 38 acquisitions. This is consistent with what Wang and Xie 
(2009) reported. 
3 The constraints of deal value are borrowed from Moeller et al. (2004) and Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007). 
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Daily stock returns from CRSP are obtained to measure the deal performance for each firm using 
event study methodology. A total of 1,607 acquisitions from 1993 to 2014 satisfied the above 
requirements, thus constituting the final sample. 
B. Variable construction 
In this section, we will clearly explain the variables in three categories. Dependent variables 
include measures of acquisitions performance. Key explanatory variables are the proxies for 
intangible capital transfer. Control variables include the characteristics of firms, deals, and 
acquirers’ CEOs. 
Dependent variables 
Following prior studies (see, i.e., Bradley et al., 1988; Masulis et al., 2007; Wang & Xie, 2009), 
we estimate the effects of acquisitions on stock prices of acquirers and targets surrounding the 
announcement date using the event study analysis. In other words, abnormal announcement returns 
of stocks are estimated to proxy for the announcement performance for bidders and targets. Our 
abnormal announcement returns, the difference between realized and expected returns, are 
measured based on the market model 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖 − ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡                       (Equation III-1) 
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the abnormal return for firm i on day t, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the realized return for firm i on day t, 
𝐸(𝑅𝑖𝑡) is the expected returns measured by the market model, ?̂?𝑖  and ?̂?𝑖  are the market model 
parameter estimates, and 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the CRSP value-weighted market index returns.  
We obtain the acquisition announcement date for the individual firm from SDC platinum U.S. 
Mergers and Acquisitions database and define the announcement date as event day 0. For each 
firm, we estimate the market model parameters using 200 trading days returns from 212 days to 
12 days prior to the announcement date. Ten days gap between the estimation period and the event 
window is applied to prevent the bias that may result from the information leak just before the 
announcement. Then we cumulate the daily abnormal returns over the event window [-2, +2] to 
obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date. The reason to 
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choose the event window [-2, +2] is that the announcement effects are captured most during this 
period without additional noise (Fuller, Netter, & Stegemoller,2002).4 
We also examine how the combined returns for acquirers and targets perform when low-intangible 
acquirers takeover high-intangible targets. The combined returns are called synergy in our paper. 
Following Bradley et al. (1988), the synergy of an acquisition is measured as the weighted average 
of acquirer and target returns, where the weights are their market value as a portion of the sum of 
the acquirer and the target market value5. We compute the synergy using cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns of the market model during the five-day event window, denoted as Synergy5. 
Key explanatory variables 
According to the general principles governing accounting for intangible assets in APB 
(Accounting Principles Board) 17, paragraph 1, intangible assets depend on whether it is internally 
developed or externally acquired. Internally developed intangibles are mostly expensed in the 
income statement and rarely capitalized as assets6. Externally acquired intangibles are typically 
capitalized by the firm as part of the Intangible Assets item, either as Goodwill (if they cannot be 
identified separately) or as Other Intangible Assets (if they are separately identifiable), on the 
balance sheet. It is straightforward to figure out the amount of capitalized intangible assets 
according to the records of intangible assets on the balance sheet, but the amount of expensed 
inputs incurred to develop intangible assets that are not separately identifiable is relatively difficult 
to estimate (Peters & Taylor, 2017). 
The stocks of knowledge capital and organization capital are estimated using the perpetual 
inventory method according to literature. The Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) uses the 
                                                 
4 Our results hold if cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using the event window [-5, +5], and hold using 
Fama-French three-factor model and Fama-French plus momentum model as well. 
5 The definition of synergy in Bradley et al. (1988) assumes that acquisitions have no effects on the wealth of 
bondholders. This assumption is consistent with evidence in Kim and McConnell (1977) and Asquith and Kim 
(1982). 
6 There are a few exceptions: software development costs are required to capitalize and are amortized according to the 
expected lifelong of software products if the software is beyond the stage of technology feasibility; some minor 
intangibles, such as movie rights, legal costs and registration fees to develop patents and trademark, and commissions 
paid for life insurance and mortgage, can be capitalized as well; see FASB (1985b). 
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perpetual inventory method to compute the capital stock of R&D (Sliker, 2007). Hulten and Hao 
(2008) and Peters and Taylor (2017) also use a similar methodology to capitalize R&D expenses. 
Lev and Radhakrishnan (2005) estimate the stock of organization capital using reported SG&A 
expenses in income statement because this item includes part of inputs to generate organization 
capital, such as advertising to build brand, employees training costs, information technology costs, 
and outlays of setting up and maintenance systems. Hulten and Hao (2008), Eisfeldt and 
Papanikolaou (2013, 2014), Peters and Taylor (2017), and Li et al. (2018) also compute the stock 
of organization capital by accumulating the deflated value of SG&A expense using the perpetual 
inventory method.  
To simplify the steps of the estimates, we follow the methodology from Peters and Taylor (2017) 
and employ their datasets directly7. They differentiate the intangible capital into two categories - 
knowledge capital and organization capital - and estimate them using the perpetual inventory 
method. To be specific, knowledge capital is estimated by accumulating past R&D spending 
𝐾𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑅&𝐷)𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡                          (Equation III-2) 
where 𝐾𝑖𝑡  is the stock of knowledge capital for firm i at the end of year t, 𝛿𝑅&𝐷  is the R&D 
depreciation rate, and 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡  is real expenditure on R&D for firm 𝑖  during year 𝑡. Peters and 
Taylor (2017) use constant R&D depreciation rates from the analysis of Li and Hall (2016) for ten 
R&D intensive industries identified in BEA’s R&D Satellite Account. For other industries not 
included in Table 4 of Li and Hall (2016), they use 15% as R&D depreciation rates instead. The 
initial stock of knowledge capital 𝐾𝑖0 is calculated using data of firm’s first non-missing R&D 
Compustat record (coincides with the initial public offering, IPO), founding year, and the average 
growth rate. The assumptions to compute 𝐾𝑖0 include that firm is founded with zero capital, and 
that pre-IPO R&D growth is the average change rate across pre-IPO Compustat records. Further 
details about the calculation are available in the Appendix of Peters and Taylor (2017).   
Organization capital is estimated by accumulating a fraction (30%) of past SG&A spending using 
the same method, 
                                                 
7 Peters and Taylor (2017) compute the replacement cost of intangible capital for U.S. public firms back to 1975. All 
estimates are available on Peters and Taylor Total Q database on WRDS. 
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𝑂𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛿𝑆𝐺&𝐴)𝑂𝑖, 𝑡−1 + 30%𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝑖𝑡                        (Equation III-3) 
where 𝑂𝑖𝑡 is the stock of organization capital for firm 𝑖 at the end of year 𝑡, 𝛿𝑆𝐺&𝐴 is the SG&A 
depreciation rate of 20% for all firms, and 𝑆𝐺&𝐴𝑖𝑡  is real expenditure on SG&A for firm 𝑖 during 
year 𝑡8. The value of 𝑂𝑖0 is estimated using the similar method to compute 𝐾𝑖0. The remaining 70% 
of SG&A spending is explained as the firm’s current period’s operating costs.  
Peters and Taylor (2017) further compute the off-balance-sheet intangible capital, namely, the 
portion of intangible capital that does not appear in the balance sheet, as the sum of the stocks of 
knowledge capital and organization capital estimated above, and calculate total intangible capital 
as the sum of externally purchased and internally created intangible capital, equivalently the sum 
of the on-balance-sheet Intangible Assets item and off-balance-sheet intangible capital. We scale 
the estimates of intangible capital and its components by firms’ total assets in the same fiscal year. 
Our key explanatory variables, the proxies for intangible capital transfer, are measured as the 
target’s intangible capital less acquirer’s intangible capital. More precisely, we define total 
intangible capital transfer (DINT) as total intangible capital of the target less total intangible capital 
of the acquirer; off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfer (DOFFBS) is target off-balance-sheet 
intangible capital less acquirer off-balance-sheet intangible capital; knowledge capital transfer 
(DKNOW) is the target’s knowledge capital less acquirer’s knowledge capital; organization capital 
transfer (DORG) is measured as the target’s organization capital minus the acquirer’s organization 
capital. The intangible capital (and its components) transfer is positive when the target has a higher 
level of intangible capital than the acquirer, or equivalently when the target’s intangible capital 
transfer makes the acquirer’s intangible capital increase. The higher the transfer of intangible 
capital, the greater the value that the acquirer would obtain from the target’s intangibles. Therefore, 
as we discuss in the hypothesis section, we expect that intangible capital transfer has positive 
effects on acquirer abnormal announcement returns.  
                                                 
8 According to Peters and Taylor (2017), SG&A is measured as Compustat variable xsga minus xrd minus rdip. If 
xrd is greater than xsga but less than cogs, or if xsga is missing, they measure SG&A as xsga or zero if xsga is 
missing. 
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Table III-1 Sample Description by Announcement Year 
Table 1 presents the average of dependent variables and key test variables by announcement years. 
The sample consists of 1,607 completed US mergers and acquisitions listed in SDC from 1993 to 
2014. DINT, DKNOW, DORG and DOFFBS represent the transfer from targets to bidders on 
intangible capital, knowledge capital, organization capital, and off-balance-sheet intangible capital, 
respectively. The variables are estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. 
Year ACQCAR5 Synergy5 DINT DKNOW DORG DOFFBS  N  
1993 -0.0101 0.0214 0.2438 0.1113 0.1686 0.2800  27  
1994 -0.0160 0.0102 0.0077 0.0070 0.0156 0.0227  59  
1995 -0.0138 0.0142 0.1992 0.1319 0.0623 0.1941  84  
1996 -0.0030 0.0315 0.0634 0.0411 0.0576 0.0987  93  
1997 -0.0124 0.0088 0.0760 0.0281 0.0534 0.0815  128  
1998 -0.0285 -0.0040 0.1679 0.1042 0.0692 0.1734  129  
1999 -0.0089 0.0115 0.0893 0.0635 0.0348 0.0983  158  
2000 -0.0354 -0.0029 0.1787 0.0824 0.0979 0.1804  113  
2001 -0.0195 0.0056 0.3077 0.1895 0.1272 0.3167  96  
2002 -0.0143 0.0045 0.2423 0.1789 0.0787 0.2576  55  
2003 -0.0174 -0.0045 0.1383 0.1032 0.0983 0.2016  74  
2004 -0.0194 0.0162 0.1612 0.0707 0.1626 0.2333  74  
2005 -0.0156 0.0080 0.2677 0.1612 0.1460 0.3072  67  
2006 -0.0136 0.0109 0.1532 0.1002 0.0691 0.1692  70  
2007 -0.0021 0.0147 0.4027 0.2097 0.2665 0.4762  73  
2008 -0.0306 0.0070 0.4580 0.4712 0.1170 0.5882  48  
2009 -0.0243 0.0005 0.3885 0.2983 0.0796 0.3779  40  
2010 -0.0091 0.0231 0.1882 0.1383 0.1263 0.2646  57  
2011 -0.0089 0.0284 0.4064 0.4086 0.0717 0.4803  32  
2012 0.0124 0.0312 0.2192 0.0950 0.1460 0.2411  46  
2013 0.0199 0.0525 0.6827 0.7211 0.0693 0.7904  42  
2014 0.0083 0.0417 0.2114 0.1144 0.1534 0.2678  42  
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In Table 1, we present the sample description by acquisitions announcement year. From 1993, the 
number of acquisitions in each announcement year increases steadily, reaching the highest levels 
in 1999, and then drops off significantly before the rebound in 2003. The number is generally 
consistent until the decline from 2008 to 2014, despite a transitory increase in 2010. The trend is 
consistent with the trend in prior literature, such as Bhagat, Dong, Hirshleifer and Noah (2005), 
Wang and Xie (2009), and Li et al. (2018). Table 1 also presents the annual means of acquirer 
abnormal announcement returns, synergies, and transfers of intangible capital and its components 
from 1993 to 2014. Acquirer abnormal announcement returns (ACQCAR5) are slightly below zero 
for majority announcement years, and synergies are greater than zero except for the year of 1998, 
2000, and 2003. The transfer of intangible assets, namely, DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS, 
are all greater than zero, implying a positive transfer of intangible capital in takeover transaction 
from the target to the acquirer. 
Control variables 
We consider three categories of variables related to the acquisition performance, including the 
characteristics of both parties of acquisitions, deals, and acquirers’ CEO.  
Firm characteristics: firm size (log transformation of the total assets), Tobin’s Q, leverage, and 
return on assets (ROA) are controlled for both acquirers and targets in the light of correlation with 
dependent variables. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) point out that a size effect exists in 
takeovers: acquisitions undertaken by small acquirers tend to have 2.24% higher abnormal 
announcement returns than large acquirers after controlling for firm and deal characteristics and 
time effect. They claim that this effect could be explained by the managerial hubris hypothesis 
(Roll, 1986) - managers of relatively large firms tend to be overconfident and are likely to overpay 
for acquisitions. For Tobin’s Q, different opinions appear. Lang et al. (1989) give evidence that 
returns of acquirers and targets are relatively higher when bidders with high Tobin’s Q acquire 
targets with low Tobin’s Q. However, the findings of Bhagat et al. (2005) and Wang and Xie (2009) 
suggest that bidder returns are negatively related to their Tobin's Q, which is consistent with our 
results. In our empirical tests, Tobin's Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of assets to the 
book value of assets, where the market value of assets is computed as the market value of 
outstanding stocks plus total assets minus common equity.  
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We also control firms’ leverage because debt reduces free cash flow and improves managers’ 
decision-making. Based on the free cash flow hypothesis of Jensen (1999), highly leveraged firms 
have less cash flow to spend and fewer resources to waste on bad M&As. Besides, leverage also 
pushes managers to improve management skill and enhance firm performance because they face 
the threat of bankruptcy (Grossman & Hart, 1982) or because they are monitored more closely by 
creditors (Harris & Raviv, 1990). Therefore, we expect acquisition performance to be positively 
associated with bidder's leverage. Following Wang and Xie (2009), we include return on assets 
(ROA) to proxy for a firm’s profitability. As the higher the ROA, the better the firm performance, 
we expect ROA (defined as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets) to be 
positively related to the bidder’s abnormal returns and overall synergies. We use Delaware State 
incorporation as a dummy variable for acquirers because shareholder rights in Delaware are 
stronger and more efficient than in other U.S. states (Romano, 1993). An alternative explanation 
is that Delaware has fewer constraints on charter rules and provides greater contractual freedom 
for shareholders and managers. These advantages allow managers to take action (i.e., involve in 
mergers) at a relatively low cost and thus increase the wealth of shareholders (Jensen and Ruback, 
1993). 
Deal characteristics: The deal characteristics we considered include: relative size ratio of target 
to acquirer, payment method, whether the acquisition is mergers of equals, whether the acquisition 
is a tender offer, whether target and acquirer are high-tech combinations defined by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), whether the deal is diversifying, and whether transaction is a hostile takeover. 
Relative deal size ratio is controlled to adjust for size impact. Asquith et al. (1983) find that 
acquirer twenty-one-days abnormal announcement returns are positively associated with the 
relative size of the bidder to the target, but target abnormal returns are not related to the relative 
size. The acquirer abnormal returns of the acquisition with a relative ratio of 0.5 are 1.8% higher 
than the acquisition with a relative ratio of 0.1. However, Travlos (1987) find that relative size has 
an insignificant and negative effect on bidders’ two-day abnormal returns. Payment method 
matters because equity offers have found to be negatively related to bidders’ stock returns (Moeller 
et al., 2004; Travlos 1987). An acquisition paid with equity signals that the acquirer is overvalued 
to the market. A cash offer instead signals good news, so the returns of acquirers in cash offer will 
be higher than in stock offers. 
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It is well-known that mergers of equals rarely success, for example, the woeful tale of the marriage 
of Travelers and Citibank in April 1998 and Daimler and Chrysler in May 1998, so we control the 
effect of mergers of equals following Wang and Xie (2009). Moeller et al. (2004) find that 
acquirers have higher returns with tender offers because almost all tender offers are made by public 
firms and paid with cash. Following Masulis et al. (2007) and Wang and Xie (2009), we control 
the combinations of high-tech companies because high-tech mergers are likely to lower the 
acquirers’ returns. Findings on the effect of diversification are mixed. Managers might pursue 
diversification to benefit themselves even when the transaction hurts the wealth of shareholders 
(Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990). Bhagat et al. (2005) also argue that diversification could be 
a signal for poor investment opportunities in the industry. However, Villalonga (2004) provides 
evidence that diversification is not necessarily value-destroying on average. Recent research on 
M&As also does not find a significant effect of diversifying mergers on shareholder returns (see, 
i.e., Masulis et al., 2007; Wang & Xie, 2009; and Li et al., 2018). Acquisitions identified as hostile 
on SDC may lead to lower acquirer returns due to the low success rate and high premiums for the 
target (Schwert, 2000).  
CEO characteristics: CEO influences corporate decisions as well as firm performance, so we 
construct several important CEO characteristics, including CEO age, gender, tenure, ownership, 
and value of in-the-money unexercised exercisable options for acquirers’ CEO. We control CEO 
age because an older CEO is likely to pursue better quality acquisitions with higher announcement 
returns while a younger CEO may announce aggressive acquisitions with lower returns and 
anticipate greater compensation from acquisitions (Yim, 2013). Levi, Li, and Zhang (2008) 
provide evidence that in bidder firms, female CEOs or female directors on the boards tend to result 
in smaller target cumulative abnormal announcement returns and reduce the bid premium. 
Management ownership is controlled because ownership of top management in acquirer firms is 
positively associated with acquirer returns (Lewellyn, Loderer, & Rosenfeld, 1985; You, Caves, 
Henry, & Smith, 1986). Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990) further find that acquirers with lower 
CEO ownership are more likely to make equity offers, and these acquirers tend to have negative 
abnormal announcement returns. Value of in-the-money exercisable options is a proxy for the 
overconfidence of the CEO since CEO is expected not to exercise exercisable options only when 
they are confident of future stock prices. Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue that CEO’s late option 
exercises arise only from overconfidence, and overconfident CEOs tend to overpay for targets and 
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undertake value-destroying mergers. The details of variables construction are included in the 
Appendix. All of them are measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the announcement year.  
IV Empirical Analyses  
In this section, we present the descriptive statistics and conduct tests on the hypotheses. Main 
regressions are run on bidder and target abnormal announcement returns to detect evidence that 
acquisitions perform better when bidders with lower intangible capital acquire targets with higher 
intangible capital. Evidence on the combined returns for bidders and acquirers, labelled as 
acquisition synergies, is also provided to identify whether the market expects acquisitions 
involving intangible capital transfer to create aggregate value.  
A Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 provides a statistical summary for the dependent and independent variables for the sample 
of 1,607 mergers9. In Panel A, the average (median) synergy over five trading days surrounding 
the merger announcement date (Synergy5) is 1.19% (0.78%). The positive figures for the combined 
returns of bidders and acquirers are consistent with the findings of Bradley et al. (1988), Moeller 
et al. (2004), and Wang and Xie (2009).  
The mean (median) for DINT is 0.1563 (0.0029), suggesting a positive total intangible capital 
transfer from the target to the acquirer. The mean (median) for DOFFBS is 0.1880 (0.0072), that 
for DKNOW is 0.1090 (0.0000), and for DORG is 0.0770 (0.0060), suggesting positive off-
balance-sheet intangible capital, knowledge capital, and organization capital transfers from the 
target to the acquirer. These preliminary statistics indicate that, on average, target firms tend to 
possess higher levels of intangible capital than their acquirers prior to mergers, regardless of 
whether it is knowledge capital, organization capital, or off-balance-sheet intangible capital. 
In panels B and C of Table 2, the mean (median) for ACQCAR5 is -1.39% (-0.99%) and that for 
TGTCAR5 is 25.51% (20.56%). This is consistent with the existing evidence that suggests 
acquirers’ shareholders suffer a slightly abnormal loss, and targets’ shareholders experience 
                                                 
9 We winsorize four proxies for intangible capital and firm characteristics (Size, Tobin’s Q, Leverage, and ROA) at 
99 and 1 percentiles of the distribution. 
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significant positive abnormal gains from M&As (Bradley et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1989; Masulis 
et al., 2007).  
 
Table IV-1 Statistical Properties of Key Variables 
This table presents descriptive statistics of key variables used in our study for 1,607 completed mergers 
over 1993-2014. In Panel A, Synergy5 is calculated based on five-day event window announcement returns. 
Intangible variables are extracted from Compustat database. Transfer of intangible variables are calculated 
by target intangible capital less acquirer intangible capital. Characteristics for acquirers and targets are 
presented in Panel B and Panel C. CEO characteristics for acquirers are also included in Panel B. The 
variables are estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. Dummy variables for deal 
characteristics are presented in Panel D. All variables are clearly defined in Appendix A. 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics-Combined 
Variable Mean STDEV MIN Q1 Median Q3 MAX  N  
Synergy5 1.19% 5.75% -13.92% -1.95% 0.78% 3.98% 18.87%         1,512  
DINT 0.1563 0.5573 -1.2884 -0.0545 0.0029 0.2342 3.9724         1,607  
DOFFBS 0.1880 0.5716 -1.1361 -0.0168 0.0072 0.2149 3.9982         1,607  
DKNOW 0.1090 0.4341 -0.9103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0443 3.4686         1,607  
DORG 0.0770 0.2523 -0.8261 -0.0157 0.0060 0.1321 1.5556         1,607  
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics-Acquirers 
Variable Mean STDEV MIN Q1 Median Q3 MAX  N  
ACQCAR5 (%) -1.37% 5.96% -21.46% -4.01% -0.99% 1.59% 14.89%         1,607  
Size 8.4780 1.7365 3.7074 7.2077 8.5336 9.8515 11.2089         1,607  
Tobin's Q 2.1842 2.2568 0.5741 1.1360 1.5482 2.3854 38.0510         1,605  
Leverage 0.1997 0.1570 0.0000 0.0774 0.1803 0.2863 1.0568         1,607  
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.1258 0.0997 -0.8256 0.0358 0.1240 0.1928 0.4426         1,582  
Delaware (Dummy) 0.5949 0.4911 0 0 1 1 1         1,607  
Log CEO Age 4.0184 0.1219 3.5264 3.9512 4.0254 4.0943 4.4308         1,604  
CEO Female 0.0100 0.0993 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000         1,607  
Log CEO Tenure 4.0494 1.0968 0.0000 3.4657 4.2341 4.8363 6.3561         1,540  
CEO Ownership 1.4884 5.0517 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.4900 43.3000         1,607  
Log, Value of Exercisable Options 7.0964 3.6250 0.0000 5.8889 8.2165 9.5350 13.9193         1,607  
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics-Targets 
Variable Mean STDEV MIN Q1 Median Q3 MAX  N  
TGTCAR5 (%) 25.26% 23.75% -14.89% 9.27% 20.56% 35.70% 115.09%         1,524  
Size 5.8627 1.8490 -0.3079 4.5714 5.8832 7.0764 11.2089         1,607  
Tobin's Q 1.9383 2.0332 0.4854 1.0572 1.3299 2.1191 32.6241         1,588  
Leverage 0.2075 0.2646 0.0000 0.0217 0.1355 0.3207 3.2247         1,607  
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0493 0.1982 -1.0000 0.0205 0.0765 0.1459 0.4426         1,572  
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics-Deal Characteristics 
Variable Mean STDEV MIN Q1 Median Q3 MAX  N  
Tender Offer 0.1910 0.3932 0 0 0 0 1         1,607  
Cash Only 0.3727 0.4837 0 0 0 1 1         1,607  
Merger of Equals 0.0075 0.0861 0 0 0 0 1         1,607  
High Tech 0.2446 0.4300 0 0 0 0 1         1,607  
Diversifying 0.2676 0.4428 0 0 0 1 1         1,607  
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Hostile 0.0012 0.0353 0 0 0 0 1         1,607  
Relative Ratio 0.1663 0.2405 0.0003 0.0182 0.0652 0.2045 1.3482         1,586  
 
In the sample investigated in our study, targets are on average much smaller in size than acquirers, 
with the mean (median) relative size ratio of target to the acquirer at 0.1663 (0.0652). Furthermore, 
the targets' average ROA (0.0493) is lower than acquirers' (0.1258). These figures echo the findings 
of Morck et al. (1990) that smaller and relatively underperforming firms are more likely to become 
targets. The average Tobin’s Q for acquirers (2.1842) is higher than that for targets (1.9383), 
consistent with the evidence that acquirers are relatively overvalued compared to targets (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 2003). As presented in Panel D, 19.1% of the acquisitions in the sample are tender 
offers, 37.3% are cash-only deals, 0.8% are classified as mergers of equals, 24.5% are recognized 
as combinations of high-tech firms, 26.8% have targets and acquirers from different primary 
industries, and 0.1% are hostile takeovers. 
The pairwise correlations between dependent variables and independent variables are presented in 
Table 3. The proxies for intangible capital transfer from targets to acquirers, DINT, DOFFBS, 
DKNOW, and DORG, are positively correlated with ACQCAR5 and TGTCAR5. DINT, DOFFBS, 
and DORG are also positively correlated with Synergy5. Surprisingly, the relationship between 
DKNOW and Synergy5 appears to be slightly negative. In general, these correlations provide 
tentative initial support for the prediction that M&As involving intangible capital transfer from the 
target to the acquirer is likely to enhance bidder shareholders’ benefits. 
B Main Results 
To test our hypotheses, we regress proxies for intangible capital transfer on the proxies for deal 
performance, controlling for all bidders and targets traits, bidders’ CEO characteristics, and deal 
characteristics described in Section III. B. 
 Table IV-2 Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
This table presents the correlations for dependent variables, key test variables, and control variables for a sample of 1,607 completed mergers in U.S. 
from 1993 to 2014. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) acqcar5 1              
(2) tgtcar5 0.101*** 1             
(3) synergy5 0.793*** 0.279*** 1            
(4) dint 0.070*** 0.120*** 0.011 1           
(5) dknow 0.038 0.121*** -0.008 0.850*** 1          
(6) dorg 0.126*** 0.083*** 0.068*** 0.647*** 0.332*** 1         
(7) doffbs 0.084*** 0.131*** 0.023 0.950*** 0.888*** 0.692*** 1        
(8) alogassets 0.087*** 0.010 -0.095*** -0.088*** -0.075*** -0.079*** -0.094*** 1       
(9) atobinsq -0.045* 0.032 -0.073*** 0.060** 0.064** 0.014 0.055** -0.197*** 1      
(10) aleverage 0.061** -0.057** 0.130*** -0.035 -0.029 -0.015 -0.037 0.146*** -0.214*** 1     
(11) aroa 0.121*** 0.095*** 0.081*** -0.016 -0.027 0.035 -0.011 -0.198*** 0.394*** -0.075*** 1    
(12) tlogassets -0.088*** -0.170*** 0.041 -0.366*** -0.338*** -0.306*** -0.402*** 0.526*** -0.224*** 0.157*** -0.253*** 1   
(13) ttobinsq -0.059** -0.019 -0.064** 0.230*** 0.284*** 0.103*** 0.257*** -0.076*** 0.473*** -0.105*** 0.233*** -0.259*** 1  
(14) tleverage 0.015 -0.005 0.039 0.131*** 0.148*** 0.019 0.113*** 0.019 -0.124*** 0.262*** -0.009 0.107*** 0.129*** 1 
(15) troa -0.017 -0.125*** 0.092*** -0.516*** -0.629*** -0.138*** -0.533*** 0.014 -0.080*** 0.093*** 0.157*** 0.303*** -0.149*** -0.084*** 
(16) tenderoffer 0.116*** 0.186*** 0.106*** 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.069*** 0.095*** -0.075*** 0.040 -0.039 0.211*** -0.168*** 0.033 -0.016 
(17) cashonly 0.217*** 0.234*** 0.157*** 0.139*** 0.114*** 0.189*** 0.169*** 0.052** 0.011 -0.028 0.229*** -0.248*** 0.034 -0.031 
(18) moe 0.008 -0.074*** 0.01 -0.024 -0.022 -0.044* -0.036 -0.008 -0.036 0.056** -0.044* 0.109*** -0.027 0.052** 
(19) high_tech -0.076*** 0.043* -0.090*** 0.144*** 0.110*** 0.158*** 0.148*** -0.216*** 0.275*** -0.245*** 0.201*** -0.300*** 0.209*** -0.184*** 
(20) diversifying 0.052** 0.091*** 0.007 0.045* 0.018 0.091*** 0.056** 0.005 0.056** 0.037 0.169*** -0.218*** 0.083*** 0.008 
(21) hostile 0.014 0.027 0.072*** -0.025 -0.019 -0.023 -0.025 0.012 -0.016 0.000 0.004 0.044* -0.012 0.015 
(22) relativew -0.189*** -0.191*** 0.180*** -0.158*** -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.165*** -0.263*** -0.100*** 0.147*** -0.035 0.350*** -0.001 0.082*** 
(23) adelaware 0.009 0.004 0.051** 0.067*** 0.055** 0.090*** 0.087*** -0.147*** 0.078*** -0.003 0.097*** -0.087*** 0.092*** 0.025 
(24) log CEO age 0.062** -0.034 -0.013 -0.047* -0.028 -0.034 -0.036 0.276*** -0.135*** 0.069*** -0.027 0.149*** -0.100*** 0.04 
(25) CEO female -0.005 0.000 0.012 -0.014 -0.013 -0.03 -0.024 -0.014 0.013 0.017 0.031 0.027 0.006 0.025 
(26) log CEO tenure 0.038 -0.040 -0.029 -0.004 0.001 0.051** 0.013 0.094*** -0.029 0.026 -0.072*** 0.014 -0.075*** -0.053** 
(27) ceo_own -0.014 -0.058** -0.054** 0.066*** 0.038 0.091*** 0.074*** -0.044* 0.057** -0.055** 0.043* -0.067*** 0.064** 0.040 
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 (28) Log, value of exercisable options 0.056** 0.003 -0.055** -0.029 -0.002 0.023 0.000 0.227*** 0.140*** 0.049** 0.137*** 0.019 0.121*** -0.034 
Variables (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) 
(15) troa 1              
(16) tenderoffer -0.053** 1             
(17) cashonly -0.051** 0.454*** 1            
(18) moe 0.012 -0.042* -0.067*** 1           
(19) high_tech -0.072*** 0.044* 0.115*** -0.033 1          
(20) diversifying 0.051** 0.150*** 0.171*** -0.02 0.039 1         
(21) hostile 0.009 0.073*** 0.046* -0.003 -0.02 0.019 1        
(22) relativew 0.215*** -0.097*** -0.200*** 0.254*** -0.023 -0.113*** 0.044* 1       
(23) adelaware 0.017 0.072*** 0.062** 0.013 0.160*** 0.032 -0.007 0.093*** 1      
(24) log CEO age 0.054** 0.068*** 0.079*** -0.037 -0.137*** 0.081*** 0.014 -0.092*** -0.016 1     
(25) CEO female 0.008 -0.001 0.013 -0.009 -0.042* 0.010 -0.004 0.024 -0.007 -0.024 1    
(26) log CEO tenure 0.011 -0.029 -0.011 -0.014 0.021 -0.006 0.004 -0.093*** -0.024 0.296*** 0.008 1   
(27) ceo_own 0.016 -0.003 0.032 -0.020 0.031 0.060** -0.009 -0.038 0.075*** 0.138*** -0.014 0.213*** 1  
(28) Log, value of exercisable options -0.008 -0.012 0.068*** -0.060** 0.082*** 0.026 -0.027 -0.196*** 0.078*** 0.049** -0.001 0.196*** -0.135*** 1 
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Deal_Performancei,t = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽3𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽6𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑡𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑞𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽9𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽10𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡_𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽11𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽12𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽13𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽14𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽15𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑟_𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑒𝑥𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽16𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽17𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽18𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽19ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽20𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽21ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽22𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐹𝐸 + 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐹𝐸 +
𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                                                (Equation IV-1) 
 
Where the dependent variables are the acquisition abnormal announcement returns for i) bidders, 
ii) targets and iii) both bidders and targets together (Synergy5); the test variables 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−1 
refer to DINT, DOFFBS, DKNOW, and DORG; the control variables include acquirer and target 
firms’ characteristics, deal characteristics, and acquirers’ CEO characteristics. In all specifications, 
we use OLS regressions with cluster-robust (by firm) standard errors on acquirer’s cumulative 
abnormal announcement returns. We also include year fixed effect and industry fixed effects in 
these tests. 
Intangible capital transfer and acquirer takeover abnormal announcement returns  
Firstly, tests are conducted to explore the first hypothesis that acquirers’ shareholders benefit from 
M&As involving intangible capital transfer from targets to bidders by regressing proxies for 
intangible capital transfer along with a set of control variables on ACQCAR5. The regression 
results are presented in Table 4. 
Column 1 shows the effect of total intangible capital transfer (DINT) on acquirer five-day 
cumulative abnormal announcement returns (ACQCAR5). Total intangible capital includes 
intangible capital both on and off the balance sheet. The estimated coefficient on DINT is 0.0084, 
which is significant at the 5% level, indicating that the market reacts positively to acquisition 
announcements involving the total intangible capital transfer. Based on this coefficient estimate, a 
one standard deviation (approximately 0.5573) increase in DINT leads to a 47 basis points (bps) 
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increase in ACQCAR5. Turn to other regressors, bidder’s profitability and managerial performance 
proxied by ROA are found to be significantly positively associated with ACQCAR5, consistent 
with the findings of Maloney, McCormick and Mitchell (1993). In line with the conclusions of 
Bhagat et al. (2005) and Wang and Xie (2009), we find that stock market valuation of targets, as 
measured by the target’s Tobin’s Q, lowers the ACQCAR5, and acquisitions purely financed by 
cash tend to increase ACQCAR5. The relative size of the target to acquirer has a significant positive 
effect on ACQCAR5, consistent with the finding of Asquith et al.  (1983). These results hold after 
including the bidders’ CEO characteristics variables, though their coefficients are not significant. 
Bidder CEO age, the CEO gender of female, and CEO ownership are negatively associated with 
bidder abnormal announcement returns. CEO’s tenure and the value of exercisable options are 
positively related to bidder returns.  
The proxy for total intangible capital transfer DINT includes the transfer of both off-balance-sheet 
and on-balance-sheet intangible capital. The next step is to investigate the transfer effect of off-
balance-sheet intangible capital in isolation. We repeat the regressions replacing test variables to 
off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfer (DOFFBS) and its effect on ACQCAR5 is displayed 
in column 2. The off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfer has a significant positive effect on 
the acquirer abnormal announcement returns. The estimated coefficient 0.0092 of DOFFBS 
(significant at the 5% level) suggests that a one standard deviation (0.5716) increase in DOFFBS 
increases ACQCAR5 by approximately 53 bps.  
In columns 3 and 4, two components of off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfer, namely 
knowledge capital transfer (DKNOW) and organization capital transfer (DORG), are used as test 
variables. In column 3, the estimated coefficient 0.0072 of DKNOW is positive but not statistically 
significant, indicating that knowledge capital transfer from targets to acquirers is not significantly 
associated with ACQCAR5. In column 4, the estimated coefficient 0.0206 of DORG is positive 
(significant at the 1% level), suggesting that organization capital transfer has a significant positive 
effect on ACQCAR5. This finding is consistent with the argument of Li et al.’s (2018) that the gap 
in organization capital between acquirers and targets drives acquirer returns. The coefficient of 
DORG suggests that a one standard deviation (0.2523) increase in DORG increases ACQCAR5 by 
approximately 52 bps. The coefficients of control variables for the two regressions are similar in 
sign and magnitude.  
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Table IV-3 Intangible Capital Transfer and Acquirer Takeover Abnormal Announcement 
Returns  
This table presents results for regression of acquirers’ five-day event window cumulative abnormal returns 
around announcement day on test variables and control variables. Test variables are transfer of firms’ 
intangible capital from targets to acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS. Control 
variables cover characteristics of acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and deals. All regressions control for 
year-effect and industry-effect. The sample consists of 1,607 complete U.S. mergers and acquisitions from 
1993 to 2014. Exclusive of missing value for some variables, 1,476 observations remain. All variables are 
estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. Robustness t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 
Model         
DINT 0.0084**    
 (2.218)    
DOFFBS  0.0092**   
  (2.366)   
DKNOW   0.0072  
   (1.378)  
DORG    0.0206*** 
    (2.739) 
Acquirer Characteristics         
Size 0.0010 0.0009 0.0012 0.0008 
 (0.595) (0.559) (0.711) (0.485) 
Tobin's Q -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0006 
 (-0.268) (-0.232) (-0.254) (-0.289) 
Leverage 0.0269 0.0270 0.0268 0.0275* 
 (1.639) (1.641) (1.627) (1.678) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0924*** 0.0936*** 0.0906*** 0.0930*** 
 (3.173) (3.209) (3.101) (3.203) 
Delaware 0.0046 0.0043 0.0047 0.0044 
 (1.267) (1.188) (1.295) (1.214) 
Log CEO Age -0.0185 -0.0187 -0.0197 -0.0174 
 (-1.181) (-1.189) (-1.249) (-1.112) 
CEO Female -0.0098 -0.0092 -0.0104 -0.0087 
 (-0.345) (-0.325) (-0.363) (-0.305) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.0011 0.0010 0.0011 0.0009 
 (0.592) (0.568) (0.593) (0.493) 
CEO Ownership -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 
 (-0.108) (-0.156) (-0.076) (-0.180) 
Log, Value of Exercisable Options 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 
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 (0.725) (0.626) (0.655) (0.588) 
Target Characteristics         
Size -0.0022 -0.0020 -0.0026* -0.0020 
 (-1.405) (-1.279) (-1.680) (-1.230) 
Tobin's Q -0.0026** -0.0027** -0.0026** -0.0025* 
 (-2.052) (-2.092) (-1.976) (-1.946) 
Leverage 0.0030 0.0035 0.0039 0.0044 
 (0.411) (0.475) (0.522) (0.609) 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.0029 -0.0018 -0.0048 -0.0107 
 (-0.224) (-0.134) (-0.341) (-0.910) 
Deal Characteristics         
Tender Offer 0.0042 0.0042 0.0040 0.0043 
 (0.967) (0.982) (0.930) (1.005) 
Cash Only 0.0173*** 0.0172*** 0.0176*** 0.0167*** 
 (4.325) (4.331) (4.396) (4.217) 
Merger of Equals 0.0463** 0.0468** 0.0463** 0.0471** 
 (2.050) (2.088) (2.043) (2.116) 
High Tech -0.0081 -0.0075 -0.0076 -0.0074 
 (-1.237) (-1.147) (-1.162) (-1.132) 
Diversifying 0.0012 0.0013 0.0011 0.0010 
 (0.305) (0.322) (0.274) (0.255) 
Hostile 0.0339 0.0341 0.0332 0.0335 
 (1.529) (1.508) (1.468) (1.467) 
Relative Ratio -0.0439*** -0.0442*** -0.0439*** -0.0438*** 
 (-3.573) (-3.596) (-3.538) (-3.590) 
Constant 0.0416 0.0413 0.0481 0.0368 
 (0.650) (0.645) (0.749) (0.580) 
Observations 1,476 1,476 1,476 1,476 
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.133 0.130 0.134 
Other Effects         
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
We notice that except knowledge capital transfer, other intangible capital transfer proxies are 
significantly associated with acquirer abnormal announcement returns. This finding corresponds 
to the degree of transparency for knowledge capital and organization capital discussed in the 
literature review. The accounting disclosure of separately reported items of R&D expenses in firms’ 
income statements and increasing media and analytical coverage of R&D intensive firms has 
improved the transparency for knowledge capital (Lev, 2000; Chan et al., 2001). This to some 
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extent mitigates the information asymmetry with respect to knowledge capital. Moreover, the 
proportion of knowledge capital is much smaller than that of organization capital. In the sample 
used by Peters and Taylor (2017), knowledge capital only constitutes an average of 24% of total 
intangibles. This small proportion may lead to the less significant contributions to takeover returns. 
In contrast, organization capital is more tacit as the investment in it is not reported separately in 
financial statement and the efforts of industry attention and capital research are not sufficient. 
Therefore, information asymmetry with respect to organization capital is more severe, and the 
investment environment is consequently harsher. 
Overall, the above analyses provide strong evidence for the first hypothesis that bidders experience 
incremental abnormal announcement returns when intangible capital transfer from targets to 
bidders increases. In particular, acquirer shareholders benefit more from organization capital 
transfer than from knowledge capital transfer. 
Intangible capital transfer and target takeover abnormal announcement returns 
Having identified that acquirers with relatively low intangible capital have high abnormal 
announcement returns when acquiring high-intangibles targets, we test whether target firms also 
have high abnormal announcement returns in such acquisitions. A similar set of regressions are 
estimated to investigate the relationship between intangible capital transfer and target shareholders’ 
returns during the announcement period. The dependent variable to measure the target’s 
performance is the target cumulative abnormal announcement returns in the five-day event 
window, TGTCAR5. All explanatory variables remain the same as those used in the tests for the 
acquirer cumulative abnormal announcement returns.  
Table 5 shows the regression results for target abnormal announcement returns. Columns 1 to 4 
present the results for DINT, DOFFBS, DKNOW, and DORG, respectively. The coefficient 
estimates for DINT, DOFFBS, and DKNOW are positive (0.0133, 0.0126, and 0.0422, respectively) 
and the coefficient of DORG is negative (-0.0133). However, none of the coefficient estimates for 
the transfer proxies across the four models is significant, indicating that takeovers with intangible 
capital transfer from targets to acquirers do not create significant value for target shareholders. The 
negative figure produced by the fourth model may imply that value could flow away from targets 
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when organization assets are transferred to bidders, however, the coefficient is not significantly 
different from zero. 
 
Table IV-4 Intangible Capital Transfer and Targets Takeover Abnormal Announcement 
Returns  
This table presents results for regression of targets’ five-day event window cumulative abnormal returns 
around announcement day on test variables and control variables. Test variables are transfer of firms’ 
intangible capital from targets to acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS. Control 
variables cover characteristics of acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and deals. All regressions control for 
year-effect and industry-effect. The sample consists of 1,607 complete U.S. mergers and acquisitions from 
1993 to 2014. Exclusive of missing value for some variables, 1,407 observations remain. All variables are 
estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. Robustness t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 
Model         
DINT 0.0133    
 (0.588)    
DOFFBS  0.0126   
  (0.538)   
DKNOW   0.0422  
   (0.992)  
DORG    -0.0133 
    (-0.330) 
Acquirer Characteristics         
Size 0.0168** 0.0168** 0.0169** 0.0173** 
 (2.224) (2.227) (2.290) (2.272) 
Tobin's Q 0.0008 0.0009 0.0014 0.0007 
 (0.162) (0.178) (0.268) (0.135) 
Leverage -0.0445 -0.0443 -0.0481 -0.0418 
 (-0.881) (-0.878) (-0.962) (-0.823) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0995 0.1013 0.0967 0.0964 
 (0.896) (0.915) (0.869) (0.850) 
Delaware -0.0170 -0.0173 -0.0184 -0.0161 
 (-1.100) (-1.119) (-1.205) (-1.027) 
Log CEO Age -0.1188 -0.1198 -0.1210 -0.1243 
 (-1.574) (-1.582) (-1.607) (-1.647) 
CEO Female 0.0092 0.0097 0.0109 0.0062 
 33 
 (0.111) (0.117) (0.134) (0.073) 
Log CEO Tenure -0.0139 -0.0139 -0.0140 -0.0136 
 (-1.578) (-1.579) (-1.590) (-1.559) 
CEO Ownership -0.0025* -0.0025* -0.0025* -0.0024* 
 (-1.802) (-1.817) (-1.830) (-1.716) 
Log, Value of Exercisable Options -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 
 (-0.238) (-0.275) (-0.269) (-0.267) 
Target Characteristics         
Size -0.0157** -0.0156* -0.0151* -0.0170** 
 (-1.976) (-1.952) (-1.942) (-2.114) 
Tobin's Q -0.0096** -0.0096** -0.0104** -0.0093** 
 (-2.120) (-2.148) (-2.263) (-2.031) 
Leverage 0.0826* 0.0837* 0.0793* 0.0860* 
 (1.723) (1.771) (1.672) (1.834) 
Return on Assets (ROA) -0.1164* -0.1166* -0.0868 -0.1289* 
 (-1.672) (-1.669) (-1.257) (-1.702) 
Deal Characteristics         
Tender Offer 0.0529** 0.0530** 0.0530** 0.0525** 
 (2.165) (2.170) (2.185) (2.154) 
Cash Only 0.0427** 0.0426** 0.0431** 0.0441** 
 (2.079) (2.070) (2.093) (2.140) 
Merger of Equals -0.0792 -0.0787 -0.0785 -0.0797 
 (-1.494) (-1.487) (-1.494) (-1.499) 
High Tech -0.0262 -0.0254 -0.0262 -0.0252 
 (-1.015) (-0.984) (-1.012) (-0.980) 
Diversifying 0.0130 0.0130 0.0141 0.0121 
 (0.721) (0.719) (0.794) (0.659) 
Hostile 0.1732*** 0.1730*** 0.1765*** 0.1687*** 
 (3.056) (3.020) (3.069) (2.944) 
Relative Ratio -0.0836** -0.0840** -0.0845** -0.0843** 
 (-2.119) (-2.130) (-2.160) (-2.141) 
Constant 0.7154** 0.7187** 0.7191** 0.7437** 
 (2.382) (2.377) (2.385) (2.462) 
Observations 1,407 1,407 1,407 1,407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.116 0.118 0.116 
Other Effects         
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Most of the parameter estimates for firm and deal characteristics show signs consistent with the 
results of Wang and Xie (2009). In particular, bidder size is positively associated with target 
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abnormal announcement returns while target size has a negative effect. Tobin’s Q and ROA of 
targets reduce their abnormal announcement returns. Tender offers, hostile bids, and cash 
payments improve the returns, while the returns are cut off by the relative size of target to acquirer. 
With respect to CEO variables, the proxies for bidders’ CEO age, tenure, ownership, and the value 
of exercisable options are all negatively associated with target abnormal announcement returns. 
Female CEOs of the bidders are insignificantly positively related to the target abnormal 
announcement returns. There is a positive but not significant relationship between the target 
abnormal announcement returns and bidder’s CEO gender of female.  
In summary, the evidence supports the argument that intangible capital transfer from target firms 
to acquirers does not make a significant contribution to the target shareholders’ abnormal 
announcement returns. 
Intangible capital transfer and takeover synergy  
The above tests provide evidence to support the hypothesis that takeovers with intangible capital 
transfers from targets to bidders create significant value for bidders’ shareholders. We also find 
that intangible capital transfers do not provide significant benefit to targets’ shareholders. This 
section focuses on the effect of intangible capital transfer on the combined abnormal 
announcement returns of target and acquirer and will examine the third hypothesis that acquisitions 
create value (not only transfer value between parties) if intangible capital is transferred from targets 
to bidders. If additional value emerges following the transactions, takeovers involving intangible 
transfer from targets to bidders create “new” value and benefit for the economy. 
Following Bradley et al. (1988), synergy (Synergy5) is used as a proxy for the combined returns 
of acquirers and targets from acquisitions. Synergy5 is the weighted average of ACQCAR5 and 
TGTCAR5, where their weights are the market values of acquirers and targets as a percentage of 
the sum of their market values, respectively. We regress Synergy5 on all test and control variables 
applied in preceding sections and present the results in Table 6. The coefficient estimates show 
that intangible capital transfers from targets to bidders have a significant positive effect on 
acquisition synergies. Specifically, the coefficient estimate of DINT on synergy5 (0.0096, 
significant at the 5% level) suggests that a one standard deviation (0.5573) increase in DINT 
increases synergy5 by approximately 54 bps. The coefficient estimates for DOFFBS, DKNOW, 
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and DORG are 0.0099, 0.0125, and 0.0156, respectively, and all are significant at the 5% level. In 
light of the economic significance, we find that ceteris paribus, the combined returns increase by 
57 bps, 54 bps, and 39 bps with a one standard deviation increase in DOFFBS, DKNOW, and 
DORG respectively. It is notable that the economic effect of off-balance-sheet intangible capital 
transfer on combined returns is very similar to that of the total intangible capital transfer, and 
surprisingly the knowledge capital transfer has a greater overall economic effect than the transfer 
of organization capital. 
 
Table IV-5 Intangible Capital Transfer and Takeover Synergies  
This table presents results for regression of synergy calculated using five-day event window announcement 
returns around announcement day on test variables and control variables. Test variables are transfer of firms’ 
intangible capital from targets to acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS. Control 
variables cover characteristics of acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and deals. All regressions control for 
year-effect and industry-effect. The sample consists of 1,607 complete U.S. mergers and acquisitions from 
1993 to 2014. Exclusive of missing value for some variables, 1,486 observations remain. All variables are 
estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. Robustness t-statistics are in parentheses. 
***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 
Model         
DINT 0.0096**    
 (2.234)    
DOFFBS  0.0099**   
  (2.336)   
DKNOW   0.0125**  
   (2.093)  
DORG    0.0156* 
    (1.814) 
Acquirer Characteristics         
Size -0.0032* -0.0032* -0.0030* -0.0032* 
 (-1.773) (-1.780) (-1.685) (-1.779) 
Tobin's Q -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0006 
 (-0.248) (-0.213) (-0.192) (-0.286) 
Leverage 0.0436** 0.0436** 0.0434** 0.0443** 
 (2.346) (2.350) (2.341) (2.388) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0420 0.0434 0.0409 0.0446 
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 (1.288) (1.335) (1.245) (1.371) 
Delaware 0.0019 0.0016 0.0018 0.0020 
 (0.542) (0.458) (0.498) (0.564) 
Log CEO Age -0.0268* -0.0273* -0.0290* -0.0272* 
 (-1.697) (-1.728) (-1.829) (-1.726) 
CEO Female -0.0066 -0.0061 -0.0069 -0.0064 
 (-0.246) (-0.228) (-0.256) (-0.234) 
Log CEO Tenure 0.0011 0.0011 0.0012 0.0011 
 (0.581) (0.562) (0.603) (0.574) 
CEO Ownership -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0005 
 (-0.885) (-0.937) (-0.861) (-0.930) 
Log, Value of Exercisable Options -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (-0.450) (-0.554) (-0.541) (-0.568) 
Target Characteristics         
Size 0.0020 0.0022 0.0018 0.0020 
 (1.100) (1.176) (1.024) (1.061) 
Tobin's Q -0.0024 -0.0025 -0.0026 -0.0023 
 (-1.477) (-1.503) (-1.469) (-1.413) 
Leverage -0.0067 -0.0061 -0.0063 -0.0045 
 (-0.817) (-0.735) (-0.753) (-0.543) 
Return on Assets (ROA) 0.0057 0.0064 0.0089 -0.0042 
 (0.377) (0.423) (0.551) (-0.293) 
Deal Characteristics         
Tender Offer 0.0068 0.0069 0.0068 0.0069 
 (1.373) (1.394) (1.363) (1.383) 
Cash Only 0.0215*** 0.0214*** 0.0219*** 0.0212*** 
 (4.956) (4.959) (5.082) (4.854) 
Merger of Equals -0.0251 -0.0246 -0.0249 -0.0247 
 (-0.951) (-0.945) (-0.948) (-0.950) 
High Tech -0.0157** -0.0151** -0.0152** -0.0148** 
 (-2.238) (-2.152) (-2.171) (-2.119) 
Diversifying 0.0005 0.0006 0.0005 0.0002 
 (0.129) (0.134) (0.129) (0.046) 
Hostile 0.0900** 0.0900** 0.0895** 0.0890** 
 (2.035) (2.013) (2.004) (1.975) 
Relative Ratio 0.0432** 0.0429** 0.0428** 0.0436** 
 (2.548) (2.532) (2.528) (2.570) 
Constant 0.1140* 0.1153* 0.1229* 0.1158* 
 (1.760) (1.778) (1.893) (1.786) 
Observations 1,407 1,407 1,407 1,407 
Adjusted R-squared 0.144 0.144 0.143 0.142 
Other Effects         
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Turn to control variables, both the magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients 
estimates are fairly stable across the four models shown in Table 6. Bidders’ size, proxied by Size, 
is significantly negatively associated with Synergy5, mirroring the findings of Moeller et al. (2004) 
and Wang and Xie (2009). The Relative Ratio is still significantly related to the combined returns 
after controlling for bidders’ size. Tobin’s Q of bidders and targets are not significantly related to 
the total value improvement, following the results of Wang and Xie (2009). In contrast, Bhagat et 
al. (2005) find that bidder’s Tobin’s Q is negatively associated with synergy. Although Bradley et 
al. (1988) provide evidence that tender offers increase the combined value of targets and bidders 
by an average of 7.4%, in our study, an insignificant positive effect towards tender offers is 
observed. Cash-only deals provide some benefit for both shareholders, but the combination of 
high-tech firms tend to reduce this benefit. Combined returns are higher for hostile takeovers, 
consistent with the finding of Bhagat et al. (2005). 
In general, the positive effects of the intangible capital transfer on the synergies support the 
prediction that acquisitions involving intangible capital transfers from targets to bidders create 
additional value. Intangible capital transfers not only contribute to acquirer abnormal 
announcement returns but also positively affect the value of the combined firms. We interpret this 
as evidence that intangible capital transfers from targets to bidders do not necessarily transfer value 
from the targets to bidders’ shareholders. In fact, the market perceives such transfers as creating 
new value, for example by placing intangible capital under the management of a firm in which it 
can be better utilized. Related studies have provided some evidence for this value-creation 
argument. Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) argue that post-merger, the joint entity is able to apply 
acquired innovation to a wider product range, thus generating extra earnings. Cassiman and 
Veugelers (2006) posit that the existence of complementarity in knowledge capital between targets 
and acquirers creates competitive edges after the transactions, especially when the knowledge 
capital is protected. Intangible capital transfers can also catalyze innovation activities and enhance 
the outcomes. Sun (2014) finds that technology-driven takeovers in China increase the patent 
applications growth ratio from 1.649 to 10.664. 
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C. Additional Analyses 
So far, the results of the main regressions suggest that the increase in intangible capital transfer 
from targets to acquirers improves the deals, and in particular improves the acquirer abnormal 
announcement returns and overall synergies. In this section, several mechanisms that may affect 
the performance of takeovers are explored in more detail. 
Product-market competition 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that product-market competition is an important force for 
improving economic efficiency. In more competitive industries, firms’ product-market margins 
are thin, and any missteps made by managers would be exploited by competitors very quickly. As 
a result, firms are forced to lower costs and improve corporate governance so that managers are 
less likely to make bad decisions. The conclusions are mixed in the literature focusing on the 
relationship between innovations and product-market competition. Fulghieri and Sevilir (2011) 
find that firms’ innovation activities are reduced with the decreases in competition. However, 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) report a negative relationship between competition and innovation 
and Aghion et al. (2002) suggest the relationship is U-shaped. 
The first question to investigate is whether the performance of M&As between high-intangibles 
targets and low-intangibles acquirers can be explained by acquirer product-market competition. 
The product-market competitiveness of an industry is captured using the Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), which is estimated as the sum of the squared market shares of the firms in each Fama-
French 48 industry. Market share is calculated as firm sales divided by industry sales. A lower 
HHI value indicates lower industry concentration and more competitive product markets. 
Table 7 presents the regression results after controlling for acquirers’ HHI. In Panel A, both the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficient estimates for the intangible capital transfer 
proxies remain practically unchanged. It is worth noting that the competitive industry indicator 
HHI has a significant negative coefficient on ACQCAR5 (-0.0307 in column 1, significant at the 
5% level, similar magnitude and significance in other columns), indicating that acquirers’ 
shareholders receive lower returns when they are in more concentrated industries. In panels B and 
C, the effects of intangible capital transfer hold when TGTCAR5 and Synergy5 are used as the 
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dependent variable, however, the coefficient estimates for HHI are statistically insignificant in 
these regressions. 
 
Table IV-6 Intangible Capital Transfer and Product-market Competitive 
This table shows results for regressions of key test variables and control variables on five-days bidder’s 
abnormal announcement returns, target’s abnormal announcement returns, and acquisition synergy. Test 
variables are transfer of firms’ intangible capital from targets to acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, 
DORG, and DOFFBS. Control variables cover characteristics of acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and 
deals. Herfindahl index (HHI) proxied for acquirers’ product-market competitive is included. All 
regressions control for year-effect and industry-effect. The sample consists of 1,607 complete U.S. mergers 
and acquisitions from 1993 to 2014. For the sake of simplify, the results for control variables are not 
reported. All variables are estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. Robustness t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
Panel A: Acquirer Side 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 
Model         
DINT 0.0085**    
 (2.231)    
DOFFBS  0.0093**   
  (2.392)   
DKNOW   0.0018  
   (0.965)  
DORG    0.0208*** 
    (2.800) 
HHI -0.0307* -0.0310* -0.0295* -0.0301* 
 (-1.815) (-1.826) (-1.747) (-1.789) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0476 0.0473 0.0571 0.0431 
 (0.757) (0.752) (0.904) (0.691) 
Observations 1,486 1,486 1,486 1,486 
Adjusted R-squared 0.132 0.132 0.128 0.134 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Target Side 
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  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 
Model         
DINT 0.0132    
 (0.590)    
DOFFBS  0.0102   
  (0.439)   
DKNOW   -0.0103  
   (-0.337)  
DORG    -0.0183 
    (-0.453) 
HHI 0.0100 0.0103 0.0132 0.0132 
 (0.134) (0.138) (0.177) (0.176) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.7349** 0.7406** 0.7583** 0.7652** 
 (2.486) (2.489) (2.571) (2.572) 
Observations 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.116 0.115 0.115 0.115 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Combined 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
  Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 
Model         
DINT 0.0096**    
 (2.255)    
DOFFBS  0.0097**   
  (2.291)   
DKNOW   0.0062  
   (1.499)  
DORG    0.0157* 
    (1.837) 
HHI -0.0057 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0050 
 (-0.317) (-0.330) (-0.263) (-0.278) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1105* 0.1120* 0.1197* 0.1123* 
 (1.746) (1.766) (1.886) (1.772) 
Observations 1,419 1,419 1,419 1,419 
Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.146 0.143 0.144 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
A dummy variable is also constructed for product-market competition, denoted as Competitive, 
where Competitive equals to 1 if HHI is less than 0.15 and equals 0 otherwise10.  Repeating the 
tests on ACQCAR5 on competitive and non-competitive subsamples in Table 8, we find that the 
effects of intangible capital transfer hold for the competitive group but not for the non-competitive 
group. One explanation for this finding could be that firms in competitive industries need to acquire 
more intangible capital to maintain their competitive edge. Therefore, the effect of intangible 
capital transfer is more significant and positive for acquirers in the competitive subsample.  
 
Table IV-7 Subsample Test: Check Product-Market Competitive 
This table shows results for regressions of key test variables and control variables on five-days bidder’s 
abnormal announcement returns. Test variables are transfer of firms’ intangible capital from targets to 
acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS. Control variables cover characteristics of 
acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and deals. Herfindahl index (HHI) proxied for acquirers’ product-
market competitive is included. Competitive dummy is equal 1 for HHI greater than 0.15, 0 otherwise. All 
regressions control for year-effect and industry-effect. The sample consists of 1,148 complete U.S. 
competitive mergers and acquisitions from 1993 to 2014. For the sake of simplify, the results for control 
variables are not reported. All variables are estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. 
Robustness t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 
5%, and 10%, respectively.  
  Competitive Non-competitive 
Acquirer Side 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0095**     0.0036    
 (2.348)     (0.323)    
DOFFBS  0.0096**     0.0028   
                                                 
10 The competitive industry cut-off of 0.15 is based on the classification in the U.S. Department of Justice, which 
consider markets with HHI lower than 0.15 as unconcentrated markets, those with HHI between 0.15 and 0.25 as 
moderately concentrated, and those with HHI higher than 0.25 as highly concentrated markets. See, 
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-08192010#5c  
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  (2.394)     (0.244)   
DKNOW   0.0105**     -0.0132  
   (2.101)     (-0.586)  
DORG    0.0180**    0.0205 
    (2.152)    (1.286) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1000 0.1000 0.1079 0.0980 0.0958 0.0965 0.1130 0.0795 
 (1.287) (1.289) (1.389) (1.267) (0.726) (0.720) (0.836) (0.607) 
Observations 1,148 1,148 1,148 1,148 328 328 328 328 
Adjusted R-squared 0.160 0.160 0.159 0.160 0.163 0.163 0.165 0.168 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Diversification effect 
There is mixed evidence on the effect of diversification. Morck et al. (1990) and Bhagat et al. 
(2005) find that diversifying takeovers have lower abnormal returns than non-diversifying 
transactions, but Villalonga (2004) argues that diversification is not necessarily value-destroying 
on average. The coefficient estimates for Diversifying in our study are not significant, consistent 
with the findings of Masulia, Wang and Xie (2007), Wang and Xie (2009), and Li et al. (2018). 
This section further examines whether diversifying takeovers affect the ability of intangible capital 
transfer to create value. 
Intuitively, we may expect that intangible capital transfer generates greater value if the acquirer 
and the target are from related business sectors. In non-diversifying takeovers, acquirers are more 
likely to be able to efficiently absorb the patents, technologies, key talents, and other intangible 
assets from the targets. Bena and Li (2014) find that an overlapping in pre-acquisition technologies 
between acquirers and targets, which usually occurs in firms in the same industry, improves the 
innovation output post-merger. Diversifying mergers reduce the number and quality of innovations 
post-merger, and firms facilitate innovation activities by establishing strategic alliances and joint 
ventures to reconcile this reduction after conglomerate mergers (Seru, 2014).  
The following specifications are included in the empirical tests. First, the tests reported in Tables 
4, 5, and 6 are replicated by adding interaction terms DINT*Diversifying, DOFFBS*Diversifying, 
DKNOW*Diversifying, and DORG*Diversifying to the original regressions. We find that after 
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accounting for diversification, intangible capital transfer effects remain, but the coefficient 
estimates for both Diversifying and interaction terms are insignificant (not reported). Second, to 
avoid industry break with respect to industry classification, we change the industry classification 
from Fama-French 48 industry to Fama-French 17 industry. The coefficient estimates for 
organization capital transfer are significant in the regressions for acquirer abnormal announcement 
returns (at the 1% significance level) and synergies (at the 10% significance level). However, the 
impact of Diversifying on the dependent variables is still insignificant. Third, we repeat the original 
regressions based on the subsamples of diversifying and non-diversifying mergers and report the 
results in Table 9. 
 
Table IV-8 Subsample Test: Check Diversification Effect 
This table shows results for subsample tests of diversification. 413 diversifying mergers and 1177 non-
diversifying mergers are included. The models are regressing key test variables and control variables on 
bidder’s abnormal announcement returns, target’s abnormal announcement returns, and acquisition synergy 
for five-days event window. Test variables are transfer of firms’ intangible capital from targets to acquirers, 
including DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS. Control variables cover characteristics of acquirers, 
targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and deals. All regressions control for year-effect and industry-effect. For the sake 
of simplify, the results for control variables are not reported. All variables are estimated at the end of fiscal 
year before the announcement day. Robustness t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for the 
statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
  Diversifying Non-diversifying 
Panel A Acquirer Side 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0078     0.0094*    
 (1.339)     (1.806)    
DOFFBS  0.0102     0.0094*   
  (1.639)     (1.780)   
DKNOW   0.0116     0.0080  
   (1.151)     (1.180)  
DORG    0.0186*    0.0189* 
    (1.711)    (1.813) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0541 0.0512 0.0559 0.0371 0.0424 0.0425 0.0493 0.0426 
 (0.416) (0.393) (0.428) (0.284) (0.549) (0.551) (0.637) (0.553) 
Observations 413 413 413 413 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.145 0.149 0.146 0.148 0.152 0.152 0.150 0.152 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Target Side 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0233     0.0059    
 (0.562)     (0.198)    
DOFFBS  0.0321     0.0000   
  (0.750)     (0.000)   
DKNOW   0.0148     0.0527  
   (0.206)     (0.975)  
DORG    0.1236*    -0.0794 
    (1.824)    (-1.612) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.9017 0.8960 0.9266 0.8053 0.8381** 0.8460** 0.8192** 0.8936** 
 (1.292) (1.281) (1.333) (1.169) (2.397) (2.398) (2.329) (2.525) 
Observations 391 391 391 391 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
Adjusted R-squared 0.054 0.055 0.053 0.063 0.122 0.122 0.125 0.126 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C Combined 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0044      0.0119**    
 (0.698)     (2.165)    
DOFFBS  0.0098     0.0102*   
  (1.426)     (1.829)   
DKNOW   0.0154     0.0150**  
   (1.430)     (1.997)  
DORG    0.0143    0.0122 
    (1.196)    (1.028) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0990 0.0951 0.1087 0.0893 0.1347* 0.1380* 0.1428* 0.1431* 
 (0.692) (0.663) (0.767) (0.628) (1.684) (1.725) (1.790) (1.780) 
Observations 391 391 391 391 1,016 1,016 1,016 1,016 
Adjusted R-squared 0.163 0.168 0.169 0.166 0.153 0.152 0.152 0.149 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
There are 413 diversifying and 1177 non-diversifying transactions included. Excluding 
Diversifying, other control variables remain in the models. The effects of intangible capital transfer 
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largely remain in the non-diversifying group but not in the diversifying group. This is consistent 
with our prediction that non-diversifying takeovers create significant value for acquirer 
shareholders and overall transactions. 
Combination of high-tech firms 
One of the motives for the acquisitions is to obtain valuable resources such as technologies, 
capabilities, and skilled human capital, which appear to be more significant in intangible-intensive 
high-tech industry. The rapid changes in knowledge-based technologies and capabilities may not 
enable high-tech firms to maintain competitiveness by internally developing intangible capital 
(Ranft & Lord, 2000). As a result, intangible capital transfer from bidders to targets may be an 
important objective for high-tech mergers. However, studies have highlighted the appreciable 
challenges to achieve this objective and the disappointing performance for firms after mergers. 
The acquisition failures for technology firms could be attributed to the difficulties to integrate 
targets’ intangible capital with acquirers’ and the relatively high employee turnover caused by 
acquisitions (Ranft & Lord, 2000; Wang & Xie, 2009). To investigate whether intangible capital 
transfer creates value for acquisitions within high-tech firms, we run the regressions on subsamples 
of high-tech and non-high-tech combination deals. We expect the value creation ability of 
intangible capital transfer to be more significant for high-tech combination deals because the 
overlapping of knowledge may narrow the boundaries across firms. 
Our sample includes 376 high-tech and 1,100 non-high-tech combination deals. In Table 10, we 
observe that intangible capital transfer, including knowledge capital transfer, are all significantly 
and positively associated with acquirer shareholder returns and synergies in the subsample of high-
tech combinations. The magnitude of the coefficients for intangible capital transfer in Panel A and 
C are greater than those in the main regressions. However, the intangible capital transfer does not 
significantly affect acquirer shareholder returns in the subsample of non-high-tech combinations. 
These results may suggest that the market perceives the transfer of intangible capital from targets 
to acquirers and the utilization of such resources to enhance the acquirers’ competitiveness.  
 
Table IV-9 Subsample Test: Check High-tech Combinations 
This table shows results for subsample tests of high-tech firms’ combinations. 376 high-tech combinations 
and 1100 non-high-tech combinations acquisitions are included. The models are regressing key test 
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variables and control variables on bidder’s abnormal announcement returns, target’s abnormal 
announcement returns, and acquisition synergy for five-days event window. Test variables are transfer of 
firms’ intangible capital from targets to acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS. 
Control variables cover characteristics of acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and deals. All regressions 
control for year-effect and industry-effect. For the sake of simplify, the results for control variables are not 
reported. All variables are estimated at the end of fiscal year before the announcement day. Robustness t-
statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively.  
  High-tech Combination Not High-tech Combination 
Panel A Acquirer Side 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0104**     0.0023    
 (2.000)     (0.493)    
DOFFBS  0.0106*     0.0043   
  (1.905)     (0.955)   
DKNOW   0.0134*     -0.0002  
   (1.792)     (-0.029)  
DORG    0.0242**    0.0108 
    (2.168)    (1.163) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0429 0.0483 0.0499 0.0468 0.0349 0.0315 0.0378 0.0287 
 (0.284) (0.319) (0.327) (0.313) (0.521) (0.471) (0.567) (0.431) 
Observations 376 376 376 376 1,100 1,100 1,100 1,100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.235 0.235 0.233 0.237 0.109 0.110 0.109 0.110 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B Target Side 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0079     0.0180    
 (0.296)     (0.736)    
DOFFBS  -0.0037     0.0285   
  (-0.149)     (1.139)   
DKNOW   -0.0232     0.0628  
   (-0.584)     (1.600)  
DORG    0.0311    0.0030 
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    (0.663)    (0.063) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.4679*** 1.4794*** 1.4828*** 1.4659*** 0.5324* 0.5154* 0.5247* 0.5578* 
 (2.627) (2.643) (2.661) (2.611) (1.800) (1.736) (1.781) (1.852) 
Observations 351 351 351 351 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.139 0.139 0.140 0.140 0.127 0.129 0.132 0.127 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C Combined 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 
Model                 
DINT 0.0145***      0.0037    
 (2.715)     (0.698)    
DOFFBS  0.0126**     0.0066   
  (2.146)     (1.276)   
DKNOW   0.0197**     0.0076  
   (2.082)     (1.146)  
DORG    0.0221*    0.0094 
    (1.888)    (0.821) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1437 0.1528 0.1559 0.1528 0.0900 0.0853 0.0914 0.0876 
 (1.040) (1.101) (1.119) (1.110) (1.345) (1.280) (1.368) (1.294) 
Observations 351 351 351 351 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056 
Adjusted R-squared 0.110 0.106 0.105 0.103 0.170 0.171 0.170 0.170 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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V Additional Robustness Tests 
A. Endogeneity 
Two major endogeneity concerns in this paper may prevent us from concluding that acquisition 
performance is improved by transfer of intangible capital from targets to acquirers. The first 
endogeneity concern is the omitted variable. Some unobservable factors could affect both 
intangible capital transfers (DINT, DOFFBS, DKNOW, and DORG) and the performance of 
takeovers (ACQCAR5, TGTCAR5, and Synergy5). To address this concern, a set of control 
variables for firms, deal, and CEO characteristics have been incorporated following the related 
works of Masulis et al. (2007) and Wang and Xie (2009). The tests for the three hypotheses in this 
study are based on firm-level estimates of intangible capital. However, intangible capital 
intensities have been changing over time, and this intensity is also likely to vary across industries. 
For example, technology, consumer, and pharmaceutical industries have higher intangible capital 
intensity than manufacturing, and the intangible intensities for the former also increased more 
rapidly from 1975 to 2010 than manufacturing (Peters & Taylor, 2017). The firm-level 
measurements of intangible capital may fail to account for variations in time and industry. As a 
result, we control the year and industry fixed effects to eliminate the effect of these variations.  
In addition, acquirer fixed effects are also applied to account for the effect of potential 
heterogeneity in unobserved bidder characteristics such as the bidder’s ability to execute better 
(poorer) deals. The findings persist when controlling for acquirer fixed-effects. Moreover, the 
magnitude of the coefficients for intangible capital transfer proxies are greater than those in the 
main regressions for testing the acquirer announcement returns. The coefficient estimates for DINT, 
DOFFBS, DKNOW, and DORG after controlling acquirer fixed-effects are 0.0099, 0.0113, 0.0092, 
and 0.0218, respectively, while for the main regressions the coefficients are 0.0084, 0.0092, 0.0072, 
and 0.0206, respectively. 
Some studies have the applied instrumental variable method to address the endogeneity issue 
related to the choice of test variables. If an exogenous shock to the regression residual affects both 
dependent variables (shareholders’ returns) and independent variables (i.e., transfer of intangible 
capital), the independent variables will be correlated with the residual term, resulting in the 
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inconsistent estimates. Using an instrumental variable that captures the intangible capital transfer 
in acquisitions but is not related to other independent variables is an appropriate way to solve the 
problem. However, this endeavour cannot be applied to our studies because of the unavailability 
to find a strong instrument to capture the transfer of intangible capital. The state-level variables, 
unemployment insurance benefits and the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine by U.S. state courts, 
which are adopted by Li, Qiu, and Shen (2018) to predict organization capital, may not necessarily 
be able to capture the transfer of organization capital of firm-level. The selection of an instrument 
that interprets little of variation of endogenous independent variables can cause large inconsistency 
in the estimates (Bound, Jaeger, & Baker, 1995). As a result, we do not adopt the instrumental 
variables approach in our research.  
Another endogeneity concern is possible reverse causality, that is, target firms may strategically 
or deliberately invest in building intangible assets but strategically underinvest in assets in order 
to make themselves attractive targets for acquirers. Phillips and Zhdanov (2012) argue that small 
firms have increased incentives to innovate more to increase the possibility of being taken over by 
large firms. However, target firms of this type do not necessarily achieve higher abnormal 
announcement returns in acquisitions. In this sample, neither target intangible capital nor its 
components had a significant effect on target shareholders’ abnormal announcement returns. 
Therefore, the relationship between pre-takeover target intangible capital and deal performance is 
likely to be causal. 
B. Sensitivity Tests 
Below we discuss additional sensitivity tests of our findings with respect to our choice of proxies 
for abnormal announcement returns. The analysis so far has relied on cumulative abnormal 
announcement returns (CAR) for a short-term event window [-2, +2] based on the market model. 
The short-term event study approach has been applied to many studies based on the assumption 
that the stock market is efficient: i.e. stock price fully reflects publicly available information, and 
a massive volume of stocks are traded around the event days. The five-day event window is widely 
used by other research (e.g. Fuller et al., 2002; Masulis et al., 2007). Fuller et al. (2002) argue that 
using event day [-2, 2] reduces noise because the announcement dates in SDC are off by no more 
than two trading days. However, there are also a number of studies using an alternative [-5, 5] 
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event window (e.g. Bradley et al., 1988; Lang et al., 1989; Wang & Xie, 2009; Hegde & Mishra, 
2017). This event window is longer and able to capture the possible effects of information reaching 
investors before the announcement date. Therefore, the announcement effect is estimated by 
extending the event window to gather more information (additional noise may be included as well). 
The long-run event study approach, buy-hold abnormal returns (BHAR), is utilized to measure 
long-term abnormal stock returns, although according to Barber and Lyon (1997), the difference 
between CAR and BHAR may not be significant in short horizons. Different valuation models are 
applied to eliminate the model bias. 
The results are robust for the following alternative specifications of the empirical tests conducted: 
1) we measure CAR over an alternative event window [−5, 5], and measure weighted synergy 
accordingly using 11-day abnormal returns; 2) we alternatively replace CAR with BHAR for both 
acquirer and target over event days [-2, +2] and [−5, 5], and measure weighted synergy accordingly 
using abnormal returns; 3) we measure CAR and BHAR using the Fama-French three-factor model 
and the Fama-French plus momentum model over event days [-2, +2] and [−5, 5], and measure 
weighted synergy accordingly using abnormal returns.  
Furthermore, additional sensitivity tests are conducted: 4) We add the number of bidders as control 
variables because bidder returns may drop as competition for the target increases (Bradley et al., 
1988); 5) We exclude industries of regulated utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999), financial firms (SIC 
codes 6000-6999), and firms categorized as public service, international affairs, or non-operating 
establishments (SIC codes 9000+) because the intangible capital measurement may not be 
appropriate for these industries (Peters & Taylor, 2017). Table 11 presents the results after 
excluding the above industries. All coefficient estimates for intangible capital transfer proxies on 
bidder returns (Panel A) and the combined returns (Panel C) are positive and significant, and the 
coefficient estimates on target returns are insignificant. Thus, the conclusion reached in the main 
regression persists for these tests; 6) We control for target’s pre-announcement stock price runup, 
which may significantly affect both bidder and target abnormal announcement returns. The 
market’s anticipation of potential acquisition attracts informed trading, leading to a runup in target 
stock price before the acquisition announcement (Brigida & Madura, 2012). Acquirers may not be 
able to fully adjust bidding premium to account for the targets’ pre-bid runup. Schwert (1996) 
points out that at least two-thirds of targets’ pre-bid runup is added to the premium paid by 
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successful bidders, resulting in the increase of the cost of acquiring targets. We measure the target 
stock price runup by buy-and-hold abnormal returns over the 200-day window (event day -205 to 
event day -6) with the market model. Our findings remain after controlling the target stock price 
runup prior to the announcement. 
 
Table V-1 Robustness Tests for Industries 
This table shows results for robustness tests of key test variables and control variables on five-day bidder’s 
abnormal announcement returns, target’s abnormal announcement returns, and acquisition synergy. Test 
variables are transfer of firms’ intangible capital from targets to acquirers, including DINT, DKNOW, 
DORG, and DOFFBS. Control variables cover characteristics of acquirers, targets, acquirers’ CEOs, and 
deals. All regressions control for year-effect and industry-effect. Industry of regulated utilities (SIC codes 
4900-4999), financial firms (6000-6999), and firms categorized as public service, international affairs, or 
non-operating establishments (9000+) are excluded from the original sample. The new sample consists of 
1,070 complete U.S. mergers and acquisitions from 1993 to 2014. For the sake of simplify, the results for 
control variables are not reported. All variables are estimated at the end of fiscal year before the 
announcement day. Robustness t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * stand for the statistical 
significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Panel A: Acquirer Side 
  (1) (4) (2) (3) 
  ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 ACQCAR5 
Model         
DINT 0.0097**    
 (2.417)    
DOFFBS  0.0100**   
  (2.464)   
DKNOW   0.0088*  
   (1.703)  
DORG    0.0198** 
    (2.488) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.0897 0.0914 0.1032 0.0880 
 (1.073) (1.093) (1.229) (1.053) 
Observations 1,028 1,028 1,028 1,028 
Adjusted R-squared 0.144 0.144 0.141 0.145 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Target Side 
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  (5) (8) (6) (7) 
  TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 TGTCAR5 
Model         
DINT 0.0172    
 (0.729)    
DOFFBS  0.0112   
  (0.466)   
DKNOW   0.0394  
   (0.896)  
DORG    -0.0133 
    (-0.318) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.6810* 0.6978* 0.6961* 0.7293* 
 (1.699) (1.733) (1.732) (1.822) 
Observations 968 968 968 968 
Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.112 0.114 0.112 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel C: Combined 
  (9) (12) (10) (11) 
  Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 Synergy5 
Model         
DINT 0.0102**    
 (2.251)    
DOFFBS  0.0097**   
  (2.178)   
DKNOW   0.0120*  
   (1.959)  
DORG    0.0152* 
    (1.662) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.1825** 0.1876** 0.1974** 0.1886** 
 (2.098) (2.159) (2.272) (2.161) 
Observations 968 968 968 968 
Adjusted R-squared 0.134 0.133 0.132 0.132 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Acquirer Clustering Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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VI Conclusion 
Based on a sample of 1,607 completed M&As transactions for U.S. public firms from 1993 to 
2014, we provide evidence that intangible capital transfers from target to the acquirer, where 
intangible capital is measured as the sum of on-balance-sheet intangible capital and capitalized 
R&D and SG&A expenses, and this transfer is positively associated with acquisition performance. 
By regressing the transfer of intangibles on deal performance proxies, we find that intangible 
capital transfer has a significantly positive effect on five-day bidder shareholder abnormal 
announcement returns and overall acquisition synergistic gains after controlling for firm, bidders’ 
CEO, and deal characteristics, supporting the hypothesis that acquisitions of high-intangible 
targets by relatively low-intangible acquirers create value for the acquirers’ shareholders and 
overall transactions. The intangible capital transfer does not appear to be valuable to the targets' 
shareholders. Additional analyses show that the value creation potential of intangible capital 
transfer is significant for non-diversifying deals, high-tech mergers, and firms in competitive 
industries. 
We also separately investigate the transfer effects of off-balance-sheet intangible capital, 
knowledge capital, and organization capital. Results show that the magnitude of the contribution 
from the off-balance-sheet intangible capital transfer is higher than total intangible capital transfer, 
and the contribution from organization capital transfer is greater than that from knowledge capital 
transfer. 
Overall, acquisitions involving intangible capital transfer from targets to acquirers not only benefit 
to acquirers’ shareholders but also create additional value for the economy. Our study offers 
evidence demonstrating that intangible capital transfer, especially organization capital transfer, is 
an important channel of value creation in M&As. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition Source 
CAR5, 
CAR11 
The cumulative abnormal returns from 2 days before event day to 2 days after the 
public announcement estimated using the market model based on the Centre for 
Research in Stock Prices (CRSP) equally weighted index, see Masulis et al. 
(2007). 
CRSP 
ACQCAR5, 
ACQCAR11, 
TGTCAR5 
and 
TGTCAR11 
ACQCAR5 is acquirer CAR5, ACQCAR11, TGTCAR5 and TGTCAR11 are acquirer 
CAR11, target CAR5, target CAR11 respectively. 
CRSP 
Synergy 
The combined returns calculated as the weighted average returns of acquirers and 
targets. 
Authors' 
computation 
INT 
Intangible capital estimated as the sum of the firm externally purchased and 
internally created intangible capital (Peters & Taylor, 2017).  
Peters and 
Taylor Total Q 
KNOW 
Knowledge capital replacement cost is measured by accumulating past R&D 
spending using the perpetual inventory method (Peters & Taylor, 2017). 
Peters and 
Taylor Total Q 
ORG 
Organization capital replacement cost is estimated by accumulating a fraction 
(30%) of past SG&A spending using the perpetual inventory method (Peters & 
Taylor, 2017). 
Peters and 
Taylor Total Q 
OFFBS 
Off-balance-sheet intangible capital is the portion of intangible capital replacement 
cost that doesn’t appear on firm’s balance sheet (Peters & Taylor, 2017). 
Peters and 
Taylor Total Q 
DINT, 
DKNOW, 
DORG, 
DOFFBS 
DINT measured as Target INT less Acquirer INT as of beginning of the 
acquisition year. DKNOW, DORG, and DOFFBS are measured using same 
method.  
Authors’ 
computation 
Size 
Natural logarithm of total assets of the firm as of fiscal year-end prior to 
acquisition announcement. 
Compustat/Aut
hors’ 
computation 
Tobin's Q 
Ratio of market value of assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding 
stock and debt) divided by book value of assets. 
Compustat/Aut
hors’ 
computation 
Leverage 
Book value of debts (as measured by long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
divided by book value of assets. 
Compustat/Aut
hors’ 
computation 
Return on 
Assets (ROA) 
Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. 
Compustat/Aut
hors’ 
computation 
Delaware 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if current state or province of incorporation is 
Delaware. 
Compustat 
Tender Offer Dummy variable equals to 1 if deal is reported as tender offer by SDC. SDC platinum 
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Cash Only 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if consideration structure reported by SDC is pure 
cash. 
SDC platinum 
Merger of 
equals 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if the deal is reported as merger of equals by SDC, 0 
otherwise. 
SDC platinum 
High Tech 
Dummy variable equals to 1 if both acquirer and target are from the high-tech 
industries, see Loughran and Ritter (2004). 
SDC platinum 
Diversifying 
Dummy variable equals to 0 if both acquirer and target are from same Fama-
French 48 industries groups. 
SDC platinum 
Hostile Dummy variable equals to 1 if deal attitude reported by SDC is hostile. SDC platinum 
Relative 
Ratio 
Relative size defined as target market value divided by acquirer market value. 
Compustat/Aut
hors’ 
computation 
 HHI 
Herfindalhl-Hirschman Index estimated as the sum of the squared market shares of 
the firms in the industry. Market share is calculated as the firm sales divided by 
industry sales. 
Compustat/Aut
hors’ 
computation 
Competitive Dummy variable equals to 1 if HHI is greater than 0.15, 0 otherwise. 
Authors’ 
computation 
Log CEO 
Age 
Natural logarithm of CEO ages. 
Compustat 
Execucomp 
CEO Female Dummy variable equals to 1 if gender of CEO of fiscal year is female. 
Compustat 
Execucomp 
Log CEO 
Tenure 
Natural logarithm of monthly tenure of named CEO. 
Compustat 
Execucomp/Au
thors' 
computation 
CEO 
Ownership 
Percentage of company's total shares owned by CEO. 
Compustat 
Execucomp 
Log, Value of 
Exercisable 
Options 
Natural logarithm of manager’s in the money unexercised exercisable options. 
Compustat 
Execucomp/Au
thors' 
computation 
 
